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This paper brings to the forefront the assumptions that we make when
focusing on a particular type of explanation for bank profitability. We
evaluate a broad field of research by introducing a general framework for
a profit maximizing bank and demonstrate how different types of models can
be fitted into this framework. Next, we present an overview of the current
major trends in European banking and relate them to each model’s
assumptions, thereby shedding light on the relevance, timeliness and shelf life
of the different models. This way, we arrive at a set of recommendations for
a future research agenda. We advocate a more prominent role for output
prices, and suggest a modification of the intermediation approach. We also
suggest ways to more clearly distinguish between market power and
efficiency, and explain why we need time-dependent models. Finally, we
propose the application of existing models to different size classes and
sub-markets. Throughout we emphasize the benefits from applying several,
complementary models to overcome the identification problems that we
observe in individual models.TABLE OF CONTENTS
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The profitability of banks is of interest to bank management, financial
markets, bank supervisors and academics. This interest is driven by
increasing consolidation in the banking sector, changes in production
technology and regulation, and dissolving borders, both internationally and
vis-à-vis related financial products and industries. As a result, explaining
(changes in) the profitability of banks is the implicit or explicit subject of
much of the banking literature. When we estimate a market power model, we
look for – the abuse of – market power as a means of explaining increases and
differences in profitability. And when we employ an efficient frontier model,
we expect sub-optimal management decisions regarding production factors to
lead to differences in profitability. 
Interestingly, and often implicitly, these expectations reflect important
assumptions not just with respect to a bank’s decision making process or its
competitive behavior, but also with respect to other factors that may help
explain changes and differences in profitability. For example, a market power
model that assumes output price competition, thereby also assumes that
products are fairly homogeneous, perhaps as a result of harmonization and
liberalization of bank regulation. And by focusing on efficiency, we implicitly
assume that it dominates other types of suboptimal production decisions
related to for example scale (or scope). Our motivation for doing so may be
the increase in average size as a result of the increasing consolidation in the
banking industry. 
This paper tries to bring to the forefront the assumptions that we make when
focusing on a particular type of explanation for bank profitability. We attempt
to evaluate a broad field of research by introducing a general framework for
a profit maximizing bank and demonstrating how different types of models
can be fitted into this framework. The fact that not all models introduced here
are nested and the difficulties encountered in comparing past empirical
evidence complicate our comparisons of empirical evidence for different
models. However, we can relate the current major trends in European banking
to each model’s assumptions and thereby shed light on the relevance,
timeliness and shelf life of different models. This way, we aim to arrive at
a set of recommendations for a future research agenda that is both
well-motivated and in keeping with current and future developments. 
9This paper continues as follows. Section 2 briefly highlights why and how
banks maximize profits. Section 3 contains a basic framework for a profit
maximizing bank, followed by an integrated discussion of different models
and an overview of how they rivet together through the basic framework.
Next, section 4 examines major trends in banking and discusses how they
relate to our basic framework. In light of this discussion, some of the existing
empirical evidence is reviewed in section 5. Section 6 concludes and tries to
redraw the future research agenda based on lessons learned in this paper. 
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2. Profit  maximization
A key assumption in much of the literature is that banks are profit
maximizers. It is in fact one of the (few) assumptions that is shared by all
models reviewed in this paper. At this point in our discussion of trends in bank
profitability, it is therefore instructive to remind ourselves of exactly why
banks maximize profits. To be sure, standard theory tells us that
a bank’s shareholders are claimants for its profits and it is thereby in their
interest to maximize these profits.
3 They maximize their return on investment
by maximizing revenue and by minimizing costs. Depending on the market
power of the bank in input and output markets respectively, it may be able to
increase output prices or decrease input prices. Bank management can select
the combination of inputs and outputs at which profits are maximized. In
order to avoid stating the obvious, and to clarify our motivation further we
therefore start by asking why a bank would not be able to reach maximum
profits. In this section, we consider four issues related to profit maximization:
(a) the role of diversification and risk preferences; (b) principal agent
problems between shareholders and bank management; (c) imperfect
competition; (d) inefficient use of inputs and outputs. 
A first consideration relating to bank profit maximization concerns the
concepts of risk and diversification. Shareholders balance their appetite for
maximizing expected profits and minimizing costs with the amount of risk
they are willing to take. Abstracting from speculative motives, shareholders
are generally assumed to be indifferent to the distribution of profits, receiving
a return on their investment in the bank either through an increase in the
bank’s share price or through dividends received. If all banks share the same
risk-return preferences, or if the risk-return relationship can be described by
some relatively simple homothetic continuous function, then there is no
serious problem with the fact that we do not know how to control for
a bank’s risk preferences.
4 This is different, however, in a situation where
some banks (e.g. cooperative banks) are highly risk-averse and not well
diversified. Such banks have different preferences, forego high-risk,
high-return opportunities and optimize towards an altogether different
3 Here profits are net earnings minus any retained earnings.
4 Homothetic functions are characterized by the linear expansion paths that we require to be
able to compare the competition proxies and efficiency measures, respectively, that we shall
introduce later in this paper.maximum profit.
5 Although control variables aimed at proxying for this risk
attitude are frequently used in the literature, comparatively little work has
been done on modeling banks’ risk-return tradeoff. Recent work by Hughes
et al. (2000) and De Young et al. (2001) has tried to incorporate risk into
a bank benchmarking exercise. Koetter (2004) has applied their model to
German banks. Given that this type of work is still in its infancy, we refrain
from including it in our general framework. Instead, we rely on control
variables that aim to proxy for banks’ risk-return preferences. 
A second consideration relating to banks’ profit maximization concerns
incentive structures. Even risk-neutral shareholders who are well-diversified
may have problems translating their claim on profits into the actions required
to maximize revenue and minimize costs. In the absence of complete
information, principal-agent theory states that shareholders are unable to
adequately monitor bank management and that the resulting managerial
discretion may induce sub-optimal behavior, i.e. profits are not maximized
and/or costs are not minimized.
6 As long as shareholders cannot monitor and
penalize bank management, the latter may show expense-preference behavior
or – if it is highly risk-averse – any other strategy that reduces profits.
7 This
means that the asymmetric information between principal and agent that was
once used by Diamond (1984) to explain the existence of banks from the
reduction in audit costs for lenders to non-financial firms, now helps explain
why banks themselves may also suffer from moral hazard and other incentive
problems. Avast amount of literature exists on ways to minimize the negative
effects of these principal-agent problems. A detailed discussion is beyond the
scope of this paper. Pecuniary and non-pecuniary incentives and yardstick
competition are ways to reduce managerial slack while keeping managerial
discretion intact.
8 Discretion itself is affected by, for instance, external control
mechanisms, supervisory institutions, collateralized debt and takeover bids.
9
Price and non-price competition, the substitutability of a bank’s products
12 Profit maximization
5 See also Tirole (1993), p. 35. The same reasoning, but to a far lesser extent of course holds
for risk-neutral shareholders.
6 This section borrows from Tirole (1993), chapters 0, 1, 6, 7 and 9, from Dewatripoint and
Tirole (1994), chapters 2, 5–8 and 12, and from Freixas and Rochet (1997), chapters 2 and 3. We
simplify the discussion in these references, for example by not discussing monitoring costs.
7 For an excellent introduction into principal-agent theory, see Arrow (1995). Seminal
references for banking are Edwards and Heggestad (1973) and Edwards (1997).
8 See Tirole (1993), pp. 35–55. In addition, regulators have considered creating deposit
insurance schemes conditional on the banks’performance (Dewatripoint and Tirole (1994) p. 129).
Barnett et al. (1994) and Barnett and Hansen (1996) study the same incentive problem.
9 See again Tirole (1993), pp. 35–55, as well as chapters 6 and 8 of Dewatripoint and Tirole
(1994).and the contestability of its markets may also serve to ensure a bank’s optimal
performance by putting competitive pressure on its management, provided
management compensation is performance-based.
10 A similar role may be
played by signaling devices such as ratings. Whether incentive problems are
important in European banking is questionable. First, few studies have
attempted to test empirically the impact of principal-agent conflicts on the
performance of European banks. Translations into empirical tests of the
situations described above where hidden action by or hidden knowledge of
bank management results in suboptimal performance are rare.
11 Second, to the
extent that the principal-agent relationship results in moral hazard conflicts,
this will only create problems if the principal (i.e. the shareholder) can not
insure himself against excessive risk-taking by the agent (cf. Tirole (1993),
paragraph 2.1). Third, although incentive problems my lead to suboptimal
performance by a bank, the extent to which this affects European banking
dynamics is unclear. There is little reason to suspect that the incentive problems
that can cause a bank to make less profits or experience above-minimum
average costs are significantly different from bank to bank, or from country to
country. The separation between ownership and control is highly similar for
commercial banks across Europe, even if institutional supervision is not.
12
Summing up, even if incentive problems can help explain bank performance,
empirically testing whether they can explain differences in bank performance
is difficult and results to date have been far from conclusive. 
Banks’performance is related to changes in their environment and the behavior
of their competitors. Therefore, a third consideration relating to banks’ profit
maximization concerns market power. Economic theory also tells us that in
a perfectly competitive situation, profit maximization is equivalent to cost
minimization. In practice however, we do not necessarily observe maximization
of profits and/or minimization of costs. Of course, exogenous factors such as
regulation or (economic) shocks can cause suboptimal performance. To the
extent that such factors do not have similar effects on both cost minimization
and profit maximization, they can drive a wedge between the two. Imperfect
competition causes a situation where profits are maximized at an output level
where average costs are no longer minimized. It can thus be used to explain
changes in profitability over time as well as between banks. Therefore, the first
class of models considered in this paper is that of market power models. 
Profit maximization 13
10 For examples, see chapter 3 of Freixas and Rochet (1997).
11 See Molyneux et al. (1997), pp. 82–83 for a short overview.
12 Cf. chapter 3 of Molyneux (1997), especially table 3.20 where standard deviations for the
EU area are small for all banks, and mean ownership (capital/assets) of private and cooperative
banks is remarkably similar.A bank may also produce at lower costs and with a higher profit than other
banks if it makes better use of its inputs and transforms them into outputs in
the cheapest possible way. In the long run, every bank has to produce
efficiently in order to survive.
13 The fourth consideration relating to banks’
profit maximization therefore concerns efficiency. For the EU, Economic
Research Ltd. (1997) hypothesizes that the single market integration program
(S.M.P.) “has allowed the (increased) realization of [efficiency gains] in
European banking markets” (p. 187). The authors conclude that “there does
appear to have been a trend for European banks, on average, to move closer
to the EU cost efficiency frontier” (p. 195). Summing up, efficiency plays an
important role in explaining the forces behind European bank performance.
Furthermore, it can aid in measuring and interpreting the sources driving bank
performance. Therefore, the second class of models considered in this paper
includes various methods for the measurement and interpretation of the
(relative) efficiency of European banks.
14 Profit maximization
13 Cf. Hanweck and Rhoades (1984).3. Methodology
Now that we have defined two broad classes of interest when analyzing bank
profitability, we look more closely at the concept of a profit maximizing bank.
Section 3.1 introduces a general model of a profit maximizing bank. Next,
section 3.2 presents a number of market power models and shows how they
fit into the basic model. Section 3.3 does the same for efficiency models.
Finally, section 3.4 works out a synthesis of all models. 
3.1. Basic model
This section develops abasic model of aprofit maximizing bank.
14Equilibrium
conditions from this model can be used to test more extreme models, namely
perfect competition and myopic oligopoly behavior (the classic Cournot
model). We assume all costs to be variable costs (in the long run), and all
outputs to be perfect complements with zero cross-price elasticity. For now,
banks are also assumed to be myopic (we will later relax this assumption). For
abank i, we define profit Π i, the output vector Yi, the input vector Xi, the output
price vector pi, and the input price vector wi. Each bank imaximizes profit using
transformation function T and pricing opportunity set H, which captures the
bank’s assessment of its competitive position and concomitant willingness of
customers to pay the prices charged by the bank. Part of the pricing opportunity
set is Z, the level of equity. For now we drop subscripts that denote different
inputs, outputs, input prices or output prices, for ease of exposition. All
variables used in this section are therefore vectors, and a subscript i always
refers to individual banks, whereas a variable without a subscript denotes the
aggregate vector for all banks in a market.
15
Since we use duality (and thus do not have to estimate input-demand and
output-supply functions), there is no need to further specify the
transformation function T or the opportunity set H.
16 For each output in the
15
14 The model described here is derived from Cowling (1976), Cowling and Waterson (1976),
and Stigler (1964). The model by Cowling describes a relationship between industry performance
and market concentration, both over time (intra-industry) and between industries (inter-industry).
15 See Hughes and Mester (1993) and Mester (1996).
16 See Coelli et al. (Chapter 3, 1998).output vector Yi, bank i sets the price pi based on the inverse demand function
f(X). Bank i then maximizes: 
where  f(Y) is inverse market demand and N the number of banks. The
corresponding Lagrangian system can be written as: 
(1)
Solving for p and X simultaneously yields the optimal output prices and input
quantities (denoted by asterisks):
Profits are maximized if:
(2)
Multiplying by Yi yields:
(3)
where revenue is denoted by piYi. Marginal costs, wi ´(Yi), depend on the price
of inputs, which in turn depends on the demand for outputs. Here, banks are
assumed to face perfectly competitive input markets, but operate in output
markets where price differentiation is potentially possible. Thus, banks may
compete via their output pricing strategies, by adjusting prices and fees
according to market conditions.
17 The extent to which they can influence
prices depends on output quantities, input prices and other factors, all of
which are given at the time of price setting. In the empirical analysis, we can
16 Methodology
17 Note that on the markets for inputs, banks are assumed to be price-takers. Therefore, they
face exogenously determined market input prices (cf. Berger and Mester (2003)). In many studies
based on (a derivation of) this basic framework, input prices are essentially wrongly specified,
since they are calculated for each individual bank instead of at the market level.disregard output prices, which are subject to severe measurement problems
according to Berger and Mester (1997) and Vander Vennet (1997), are not
required for the empirical analysis. 
We further rewrite and rearrange equation 3, in order to arrive at an equation
that is more closely in line with what is found in the empirical literature on
bank performance. We start by defining:
(4)
where λ i is known as the conjectural variation of firm i’s output.
18 Substitution
of λ i in equation 3 and multiplying by Yi gives:
(5)
Dividing both sides by piYi and rearranging gives:
(6)
The left-hand side of equation 6 is the bank’s mark-up over its total costs. This
mark-up can be decomposed into three parts, equivalent to the right-hand side
of equation 6: 
1. (Yi/Y) is firm i’s market share, with 0 < MS ≤ 1. 
2. f´(Y)Y/p is the inverse of the market price elasticity of demand, 1/η D. Since
the main prices for banks in the context of this analysis are interest rates,
η D is referred to as the interest elasticity of demand. 
3. 1+ λ i measures firm i’s expectations about the reactions of its rivals dY/dYi,
with –1 ≤ λ ≤ 1. 
We can now write equation 6 as:
(7)
After multiplying by pi
*Yi we have:
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18Ahigh λ i means a firm has a high awareness of its interdependence with other firms. If firms
are indeed myopic, their λ i is zero.(8)
Therefore optimal profits Π i
* go up with an increase in the market share MSi,
with a decrease in the price elasticity of demand η D, with an increase of the
conjectural variation λ i, an increase in the price of outputs pi
*, and an increase
in demand for Yi. As we shall see in the remainder of this section, many
models that study competition and efficiency can be classified according to
this basic framework. All models contain a partial analysis, and focus on
a single right-hand variable in equation 8, or a combination of two of these
variables. 
3.2. Market power
This section summarizes the various approaches to measuring competition
and profitability, and how they are related to the framework presented above.
In the context of the models discussed here, there may be circumstances
where banks can increase their prices and be rewarded by higher profits. They
can do so because the drop in demand that would normally result from such
an increase is not entirely offset by the extra marginal revenue gained by the
price increase. These circumstances are broadly defined as market power. In
light of equation 8 above, market power is derived from MSi, η D, or λ i, or
a combination of these variables. 
3.2.1. Iwata
In the Iwata model (Iwata, 1974), the right-hand side of equation 8 is written as:
(9)
Thus, the model allows for the estimation of conjectural variation values for
individual banks supplying a homogeneous product in an oligopolistic
market. Although, to the best of our knowledge, this measure has been applied
only once to the banking industry, it is included in the present overview for
completeness’ sake. 
A general problem with these models, which we will see again in the
subsections below, is the fact that some of the determinants of profitability
that we have identified sofar are interrelated and/or cannot be observed in
practice. In order to solve a possible identification problem, in particular
18 Methodologywhen applying these models empirically, these models therefore generally
begin by defining a set of limiting assumptions. In this case, the Iwata model
assumes that p and MSi are strict functions of exogenous variables, and that
η D, the elasticity of demand, is constant. Now we can derive an indirect
estimate of the conjectural variation λ by estimating a market demand
function and cost functions for individual banks to quantify the conjectural
variation for each bank. Applying this model to the banking industry is
difficult, particularly for the European industry, where micro data for the
structure of cost and production for homogeneous products are scarce or
lacking altogether. 
3.2.2. Bresnahan
Contrary to Iwata (1974), Bresnahan (1982) and Lau (1982) assume that all
banks are equal and identical and make an aggregate analysis. In this
short-run model, they thereby determine the level of market power in the
banking market and take averages over equation 8 thus obtaining:
(10)
This is equal to:
(11)
if we define λ as and assume that all banks
are equal (so that the definition of λ holds for each i). The bars in equation 11
refer to average values; – w,  – Y and – X represent the average cost function,
average output and average input, respectively. 
Banks maximize their profits by equating marginal cost and perceived
marginal revenue. The perceived marginal revenue coincides with the
demand price in competitive equilibrium and with the industry’s marginal
revenue in the collusive extreme (Shaffer, 1993). Based on time-series of
industry data, the conjectural variation parameter, λ , is now equal for all
banks and determined by simultaneous estimations of the market demand and
supply curves. 
For the average bank in a perfectly competitive market, the restriction λ = 0
holds, as, in a competitive equilibrium, price equals marginal cost. Since
prices are assumed to be exogenous to the firm in a perfectly competitive
market, an increase in output by one firm must lead to an analogous decrease
Methodology 19in output by the remaining firms, in line with equation 11. The Cournot
equilibrium describes non-cooperative optimization, where agents who
mutually influence each other act without explicit cooperation. Under that
type of equilibrium, the conjectural variation (d∑i≠ jYj/dYi) for firm i would equal
zero. The Cournot equilibrium assumes that a firm does not expect retaliation
from other firms in response to changes in its own output, so that λ = 1/n and
, with h(·) = f’(Y)Y, represent the semi-elasticity of
market demand. Under perfect collusion, an increase in output by one of the
colluders leads to a proportional increase in output by all other colluders,
yielding , ∀ i,
19 so that 
. Hence, under normal conditions, the parameter λ takes
values between zero and unity. 
Empirical applications of the Bresnahan model are scarce. The model has
been estimated by Shaffer (1989 and 1993) for, respectively, the US loan
markets and for the Canadian banking industry. Suominen (1994) applied the
model in its original one-product version to the Finnish loan market for the
period 1960–84. An adapted two-product version is applied to the period after
deregulation (September 1986–December 1989). Suominen finds zero λ ’s for
the period with regulated interest rates in both markets, and values of
λ indicating use of market power after the deregulation of the loan market.
Swank (1995) estimated Bresnahan’s model to obtain the degree of
competition in the Dutch loan and deposit markets over the period 1957–90,
and found that both markets were significantly more oligopolistic than under
Cournot equilibrium. Bikker (2003) presents applications of the Bresnahan
model to loans markets and deposits markets in nine European countries over
the last two or three decades. Where values of λ appear to be significantly
different from zero, so that perfect competition should be rejected, they are
nevertheless close to zero. In many submarkets, the hypothesis λ = 0 (that is,
perfect competition) can not be rejected. 
3.2.3. Panzar-Rosse
Most of the models we derive here assume Cournot competition. In fact, this
is the assumption in the model by Cowling (1976) from which our basic
framework is derived. An important exception is the Panzar-Rosse model.
 
20 Methodology
19 The assumptions underlying the Cournot oligopoly theory according to Hause (1977) are:
homogeneous products, n firms with strictly increasing marginal cost functions (which need not
be identical), independent (non-cooperative) behaviour of firms to maximize their own profits, no
entry, and industry demand is strictly decreasing.Aside from the fact that price information is notoriously scarce and unreliable
for banking markets, not much is know about the role of Cournot and
Bertrand competition respectively in banking. However, with quantity
precommitments the Panzar-Rosse model reduces to a basic Cournot model.
20
Therefore, we include it in the present analysis. 
The method developed by Panzar and Rosse (1987) estimates competitive
behavior of banks on the basis of the comparative static properties of
reduced-form revenue equations based on cross-section data. Panzar and
Rosse (P–R) show that if their method is to yield plausible results, banks need
to have operated in a long-term equilibrium (that is to say, the number of
banks needs to be endogenous to the model) while the performance of banks
needs to be influenced by the actions of other market participants.
Furthermore, the model assumes a price elasticity of demand, η D, greater than
unity, and a homogeneous cost structure. To obtain the equilibrium output and
the equilibrium number of banks, profits are maximized at the bank as well as
at the industry level when marginal revenue equals marginal cost (cf equation 8).
Let wi be a vector of K input prices (for K inputs). In equilibrium, the zero
profit constraint holds at the market level:
(12)
which is equal to equation 8, aggregated over all firms i(MSiis now the average
MS). Variables marked with an asterisk represent equilibrium values. Now we
assume that MSi and λ are strict functions of exogenous variables. Market
power is then measured by the extent to which a change in factor input prices
(∂ wki) is reflected in the equilibrium revenues (∂ Ri
*) earned by bank i. Panzar
and Rosse define a measure of competition, the ‘H-statistic’as the sum of the
elasticities of the reduced-form revenues with respect to the K input prices:
21
(13)
The estimated value of the H-statistic ranges between −∞ and 1. H is smaller
than zero if the underlying market is a monopoly, it ranges between zero and
unity for other types of competition such as oligopoly, and an H of one
indicates perfect competition. Shaffer (1983) demonstrated formal linkages
Methodology 21
20 On a more theoretical level, our basic framework can lead to the same 2–player
competitiveness that we find in many (simple) Bertrand models.
21 See Panzar and Rosse (1987) or Vesala (1995) for details of the formal derivation of the
H-statistic.between the Panzar–Rosse H-statistic, the conjectural variation elasticity and
the Lerner index. Table 3.5 in Bikker (2004) provides an overview of studies
which test the P–R method for the banking industry. 
3.2.4. Structure-Conduct-Performance
The Structure-Conduct-Performance (SCP) model assumes that market
structure affects bank behavior (conduct) which in turn influences bank
performance. In a market with a higher concentration, banks are more likely
to show collusive behavior, and their oligopoly rents increase performance
(profitability). Here, conduct is an unobservable and is measured indirectly
through market concentration. 
Although the SCP hypothesis lacks a formal underpinning, we can use our
basic profit model to derive the SCP relationship. We start by deriving our





where HHI= Σ (Yi/Y)
2, i.e. the Hirschman-Herfindahl index, and µ= (Σ λ iYi)/(Σ Yi
2). 
To  arrive at the basic SCP relationship, we have to make two additional
assumptions. The first is that η D, the price elasticity of demand is constant. If
not, the interpretation of a coefficient for MSi – in the absence of a proxy for
η D – could be biased downward (upward) by increases (decreases) in the
interest elasticity of demand over time. The second assumption concerns the
individual firm’s conjectural variation λ i, the extent to which it expects other
firms to react to a change in output. Here, there are two options. The first is
to assume that λ i is constant and equal across firms, in which case it drops out
of the above equation and we are left with a relationship between
performance and market share.
22 The second option is to formalize the
relationship between λ i and MSi, under the presumption of collusive behavior.
22 Methodology
22 Not surprisingly, this is also a necessary condition for the myopic Cournot oligopolist, who
is ignorant of the impact of his actions on his competitors and therefore not prone to collusive
behavior.Following Stigler (1964), we can show that an increase in market share MSi
is expected to increase awareness (λ i) and thereby lead to more collusive
behavior (for proof, see the appendix). Although this still leaves us without
a direct measure of λ i, it does allow us to capture its impact through MSi. After
all, the collusive oligopolist realizes a more than proportional increase in
performance as a result of an increase in market share. Alternatively, the
penalty for uncollusive behavior increases with market size. 
All in all, if we take η D to be constant and λ i (or λ ) to be an implicit function
of HHI we have developed a basic relationship between performance and
structure that is consistent with the SCP relationship.
23 The basic equation
(without control variables) is then:
(16)
The model amounts to interpreting the combined impact of λ and HHI on
performance. In two extreme cases, interpretation of the coefficient  is
straightforward. The Cournot oligopoly prediction is  = 1, since λ = 0
and impact of HHI is exactly proportional. If collusive behavior exists, λ > 0
and the impact of market share is more than proportional, and  > 1.
Finally, in the case of perfect competition an increase in market share has no
impact on performance and since λ = –1, this means that  = 0
Summing up, we have derived a relationship between market structure and
performance, allowing us to test the SCP hypothesis (cf. Bos (2004) for an
overview and a critical analysis). 
3.2.5. Cournot model
In deriving the SCPmodel in the previous subsection, we have assumed that all
banks react similarly to an increase in market concentration, and that they benefit
equally. Thereby we have implicitly addressed one of the major weaknesses of
the SCPhypothesis: the choice of a measure for market concentration. 
Methodology 23
23 As explained, for the collusive oligopoly we assume a λ i that is not constant but
unmeasurable – except through MSi. In the collusive Cournot oligopoly an increase in output Yi
by a bank i has the consequence that all banks in the market increase their output proportionally.
This is consistent with a dynamic Cournot equilibrium.It became the reason why the SCP model became subject to criticism. For
example, the idea that all banks benefit equally from a high level of market
concentration runs counter to much of the theoretical literature that identifies
strategic group behavior and more elegantly translates asymmetric market
structures into performance differences. In section 3.1, we have developed
a model that also describes a relationship between industry performance and
market concentration. In fact, the model described in section 3.1 is the
disaggregated version of the basic framework that we used to derive the SCP
model. As we will see in the present subsection, this modification makes it
easier to accommodate asymmetric market structures, differences in cost
structures and collusive behavior. 
As in section 3.2.4, we start from equation 8, assume that η D is constant and
arrive at:
(17)
Following the proof in the appendix, we can again show that an increase in
market share MSi is expected to increase awareness (λ i) and hence to lead to
more collusive behavior. We can therefore model λ i as an implicit function of
MSi and have now arrived at the same relationship as in equation 16, beit on
a disaggregated level.
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Although all coefficients can be interpreted in the same way as those in
equation 16, this Cournot model does not measure exactly the same relationship
as the SCP model. Whereas the latter concentrates on the impact of market
structure, the former focuses on individual banks’ market share. However, in
doing so it more accurately captures asymmetric market structures, differences
in cost structures and collusive behavior. In fact, Bos (2004) has shown
empirically that estimates of equation 17 are consistent with the model’s
assumptions, whereas the same does not always hold for equation 16. 
3.3. Efficiency
In all models introduced so far, we assume that banks choose the optimal
output prices p and inputs x that maximize profits, given existing market
power. Therefore, any deviations from the profits that would prevail under
24 Methodology
24 As argued by Cowling (1976), firms could need time to adjust to the new competitive
situation and the impact of an increase in market share on performance may therefore involve
a lag. In empirical applications, a one-year lag is therefore applied to MSi.perfect competition are entirely attributed to (changes in) the degree of
competition in the market. 
In practice, of course, banks may choose suboptimal combinations of output
prices and inputs. They may produce an output at suboptimal scale, produce
a suboptimal combination of outputs, or select a suboptimal combination of
inputs (or input prices) to produce outputs. In short, banks may be
inefficient.
25 The general concept of efficiency refers to the difference
between observed and optimal values of inputs, outputs, and input/output
combinations. In this section, we therefore introduce a second class of models
that attempt to measure the extent to which firms may realize suboptimal
profits. As it has been shown by Berger and Humphrey (1991) to dominate
other inefficiencies, we start with X-efficiency in section 3.3.1. Next, we
introduce scale and scope economies in section 3.3.2. Of course, as is already
clear from this short introduction, the effects of efficiency and competition on
profitability are not always easy to distinguish. Therefore, in section 3.3.3, we
present a discussion of the efficiency hypothesis as an example of the
relationship between both classes of models. 
3.3.1. X-Efficiency
Berger, Hunter and Timme (1993) define X-efficiency as the economic
efficiency of any single firm minus scale and scope efficiency effects.
26
Berger and Humphrey (1991) report that scale and scope inefficiencies
(amounting to about 5 percent) are less important in the banking industry than
X-inefficiencies (in the range of 20–25 percent).
27
This paper uses stochastic frontier models to measure X-efficiency (as well as
scale and scope economies). In light of the framework presented here,
stochastic frontier models have the advantage that they use the same
elementary set of assumptions about bank production as our basic model, and
can thus be easily fitted into this framework.
28 Related, by using stochastic
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25 In our use of wording, we shall be relatively lighthearted about the precise distinction
between productivity and efficiency. For a more formal treatment of the topic, see Coelli et al.
(1998).
26 Economic efficiency is the sum of technical and allocative efficiency. Technical efficiency
is a measure of a bank’s distance from the frontier, minimizing inputs given outputs or vice versa.
Allocative efficiency measures the extent to which a bank is able to use inputs and outputs in
optimal proportions given prices and the production technology.
27 See also Berger and Humphrey (1997) and Molyneux, Altunbas and Gardener (1997).
28 Cf. in this respect deterministic models with for example Data Envelopment Analysis.frontiers, we recognize the fact that in measuring bank profitability as we do
with our basic model, we also experience some measurement error as not all
deviations from optimal (predicted) profit may be due to inefficiency. Afinal,
but less specific, advantage that has been widely used in the literature, is the
fact that stochastic frontier models generate bank-specific efficiency
estimates, which allow us to test for differences in efficiency among banks in
different countries as well as to measure the scale and scope economies of
banks that operate close to the frontier. 
Stochastic frontier models have been estimated most frequently for cost
minimization models. In fact, most of the empirical evidence we present in
this paper refers to cost efficiency estimations. Here, however, we make
a case for profit maximization models. In particular, we build on our basic
model from section 3.1 to arrive at the alternative profit model by Humphrey
and Pulley (1997), Berger and Mester (1997), and DeYoung and Hassan
(1998). In this model, banks are assumed to face perfectly competitive input
markets but operate in output markets where price differentiation is
potentially possible. Thus, the model allows for market power. Banks can
compete via their output pricing strategies by adjusting prices and fees
according to market conditions. The extent to which they can influence prices
depends on output quantities, input prices, and other factors, all of which are
given at the time of price setting. Additional features of the profit model are
that it can account for differences in the quality of outputs (to the extent that
it is reflected in prices) as well as correct for scale bias. Also, output prices,
which are subject to severe measurement problems according to Berger and
Mester (1997) and Vander Vennet (1997), are not required for the empirical
analysis.
29 The same holds, of course, for our basic model from section 3.1.
Let us therefore start by making that model stochastic. In line with the
literature, we assume for now that η D is constant, and we ignore λ i and MSi:
30
(18)
We  assume that ε i can be decomposed into a noise component ν i, and an
efficiency component ui, where ε i = ν i – ui. Here, ν i is normally distributed,
i.i.d. with ν i ∼ N(0,σ ν
2). The inefficiency term ui is drawn from a non-negative
half-normal distribution truncated at µand i.i.d. with ui ∼ |N(µ,σ u
2)|. It carries
a negative sign because all inefficient firms will operate below the efficient
26 Methodology
29 For a theoretical framework for the Stochastic Frontier models used here, see Coelli,
Prasado Rao, and Battese (1998) and Bos (2002).
30 For a description of the functional form and empirical specification used to estimate this
model see section 5.2.profit frontier. Profit efficiency for bank i is defined as:
(19)
This measure takes on a value between 0 and 1, where 1 indicates a fully
efficient bank. The frontier functions are estimated through maximum
likelihood methods. In the estimation, the terms σ u
2 and  σ ν
2 are
reparameterized by σ
2 = σ u
2 + σ ν
2 and γ = σ ν /σ u. If the parameter γ is close to
zero, little structural inefficiency exists and standard OLS estimation may be
appropriate. Extremely large parameter values of γ suggest a deterministic
frontier.
31 We  can of course apply the same logic to a cost minimization
model, considering that ε i = ν i + ui since inefficient banks now operate above
the minimum cost frontier. 
3.3.2. Scale and scope economies
X-inefficiency results from a suboptimal choice of output prices and inputs.
Hence it is also frequently referred to as managerial efficiency. Although,
when measuring performance, it is sometimes difficult to disentangle
endogenous factors from exogenous factors, there is evidence that
X-efficiency captures the former, far more fully than the latter. E.g., Bos and
Kool (2004) find that exogenous, environmental factors explain no more then
20% of the differences in X-efficiency of a group of relatively homogenous
banks. 
There are, however, other types of efficiency (or economies) that – although
much more exogenous to the firm – can have a significant impact on bank
performance. Banks may be operating at a suboptimal scale, or with
a suboptimal mix of outputs. Here, we therefore briefly discuss economies of
scale and economies of scope, respectively.
32
We define output-specific economies of scale as the ceteris paribus increase
in profits that results from an increase in output Yk. To this purpose we take
equation 8 and calculate the derivative respect to Yk:
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31 Note that the hypothesis we present in section 3.4,  , should be tested
conditional on the fact that γ > 0.
32 We  shall refrain from discussing the relationship of both types of efficiency with
X-efficiency.(20)
A value larger (smaller) than one indicates increasing (decreasing) returns to
scale, and unity indicates constant returns to scale. Overall economies of scale
are simply the sum of output-specific economies of scale. 
Berger, Hunter, and Timme (1993) identified four aspects of the measurement
of economies of scale that are relevant to our analyses. First and foremost,
research has confirmed that banks have U-shaped cost curves. Economies of
scale increase up to a relatively modest size, often estimated in the range of
$100–$500 million in total assets, after which they tend to decrease (albeit
slowly). Second, risk variables are often excluded when measuring
economies of scale. Following Mester (1996) and Berger and Mester (1997),
this problem can be resolved by including an equity/total assets ratio that
enters scale measures via interaction terms in e.g. a translog specification. 
Third, many studies base their scale measures on averages, thereby including
observations that do not lie on or close to the efficient frontier. In this case
economies of scale will be biased to the extent that banks do not lie on or
close to the efficient frontier.
33 Fourth, the most reliable measure of
economies of scale is an overall estimate, defined as the sum of
output-specific economies of scale. The sum of the partial derivatives of each
output is less dependent on changes and differences in the output mix. 
The extent to which that output mix itself is optimal is measured by
calculating scope economies. Unfortunately, calculating scope economies is
not as straightforward as calculating scale economies. The derivation itself is
straightforward, and analogous to equation 20:
(21)
The main problem with this method lies in the fact that, at least theoretically,
we require banks with zero outputs for specific outputs Yk (cf. Berger and
Humphrey (1994)). However, the models we have discussed so far are usually
estimated using logarithmic (semi-)flexible forms and thereby cannot handle
these zero outputs. In addition, Berger, Hanweck, and Humphrey (1987)
observed that for translog functions complementarities cannot exist at all
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33 This is reflected by a significantly positive value for µ/σ u.levels of output. Finally, in many cases there is an extrapolation problem as
well. Given a sample containing both universal banks and other banks, only
the former banks typically offer the full range of financial services.
Consequently, the economies of scope derived from the cost (or profit)
function tend to overestimate the true economies of scope among most
sample banks. A further problem is that the measurement of average
economies of scope yields values that are biased due to the inclusion of
X-(in)efficiencies. In the search for a better functional form, some researchers
have used a Box-Cox transformation for outputs, while others have used
a composite function with a separate fixed-costs component of scope
economies. 
For cost models Molyneux, Altunbas, and Gardener (1997) proposed
a comparison of the separate cost functions for individual outputs with the
joint cost of production. However, the plant and firm level data required for
this type of analysis are often not available. An alternative method is
suggested in Bos and Kolari (2005). They specificy a model with three
outputs, Y1, Y2, and Y3, which sum to Y. They start by defining Y1/Y = a,
Y2/Y = b and Y3/Y = c. If such a ratio is high, a bank is relatively highly




2. This measure is bounded by 1/3 (not specialized) and 1
(specialized). Define ‘high’ [H] as referring to the upper 25
th percentile, and
‘low’ [L] for the remainder of the observations. Now, the ratio (Π L




can be calculated for Y1, Y2, Y3, and Y. Profits Π i
* are divided by total revenues
to adjust for the possibility that banks in high and low bank groups may have
different size. If scope economies exist, the ratio is greater than 0. Note that
these ratios can only be constructed using averages; as such, the scope
measure itself does not have a standard deviation. This is a common problem,
as recognized by Berger and Humphrey (1991). Instead, Bos and Kolari
(2004) report a t-value for an independent samples test for Π L
* – Π H
*. Note that
by varying the cut-off point to more or less than the 25
th percentile, it is
possible to check for extrapolation problems. 
3.3.3. Efficiency hypothesis
An important critique of both classes of models discussed so far is the fact
that they focus on one half of the story (market power or efficiency,
respectively), without being able to control adequately for the other half. For
example, in the Cournot model discussed in section 3.2.5 we consider market
power to be the sole explanation for differences in market share. The
Efficiency hypothesis has been developed as an important alternative
Methodology 29explanation. This section provides a critical review of the way the Efficiency
hypothesis can be tested against the market power hypothesis and proposes an
alternative test of the Efficiency hypothesis that resolves identification
problems when using market power and efficiency to explain bank
performance.
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The Efficiency hypothesis attributes differences in performance to differences
in efficiency (Goldberg and Rai (1996)), Smirlock (1985)). According to the
Efficiency hypothesis, both a high market share and relatively good
performance result from high efficiency. Thus, whereas according to the
traditional SCP hypothesis and the above Cournot model a high degree of
market concentration, or respectively, a high market share is an explanatory
variable for above average performance, within the Efficiency hypothesis it is
seen as, at most, the result of a higher efficiency. Testing the Efficiency
hypothesis against the SCP hypothesis therefore generally involves including
both market shares and a market structure variable in the estimated equations.
The premise is that if the Efficiency hypothesis holds, once individual banks’
market share is controlled for, overall market concentration does not explain
profits (cf. Demsetz (1973)). 
Tests aimed at setting off both hypotheses against each other tend to suffer
from identification problems, since the same market structure variable
behaves similarly for both cases. In these tests, market share proxies both for
market power – as does the market structure variable – and for efficiency. The
market structure variable is an aggregate measure that only changes over
time. The market share variable, however, differs from bank to bank as well
as over time. In an attempt to overcome this problem Berger and Hannan
(1993) and Altunbas et al. (2001) use both market share and efficiency as
explanatory variables for bank profit. In these studies, however,
a multicollinearity problem exists if the Efficiency hypothesis holds. 
Another solution is to include the market share that is not explained by
efficiency, using firm-specific efficiency measures.
35 To  do so, MSi,t is
regressed on an efficiency measure. Cost X-efficiency [CE] measures how
close a bank’s costs, conditional upon its output, input prices and equity level,
are to the costs a fully efficient bank incurs under the same conditions
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34 See also Bos (2004), on which this section is based.
35 This modification is explained for the Cournot model and therefore in loglinear form.
However, it can just as well be applied (without taking logarithms) to the traditional SCP model.(e.g. size). As such, it is considered here to be the best efficiency measure to
use in this two step approach:
36
MSi = f(CEi)ω (22)
where ω is the error term. Now, we can estimate equation 17, but replace MSi
by MS(CE)i – the residuals of the above equation. This efficiency measure
MS(CE)i is by definition orthogonal on CEi. If we now ignore λ i and again
keep η D constant, the Cournot equation reads:
37
(23)
where φ is the error term. This way, we can test both the SCP hypothesis and
the Efficiency hypothesis without any identification problems. Of course,
both hypotheses are not mutually exclusive. We can compare them by
comparing the results of estimating equation 17 with those of estimating
equation 23. If the market power hypothesis holds,  is significant
and positive under both specifications. On the other hand, if  is
positive and significant when estimating equation 23, this is evidence in favor
of the Efficiency hypothesis. 
As a final remark, note that our improvement of the Efficiency hypothesis
comes at a cost: in equation 23, φ is a function of ε and ω . Since we use
a proxy instead of MSi in this two-step estimation, our standard errors may
suffer from the generated regressor problem, and the accuracy of our
estimates as well as the significance of our parameters may be over-estimated. 
3.4. Synthesis
In section 3.1, we have established that banks maximize profits according to
equation 1. Subsequently we looked at different models in the literature that
have tried to explain bank profits, either through market power or through
efficiency, and saw how they fitted into this basic framework. In table 1 we
summarize the results from our tour of profit models.
38
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36 Profit X-efficiency would not really solve this problem, since – to the extent that a bank with
market power can maximize profits without minimizing costs – it basically captures the same
effect as MS.
37 The same can of course be done with equation 17.
38 The null hypothesis is based on the premise that profits increase: i.e. market power exists or
efficiency goes up.Table 1. Synthesis of Models
Model Hypotheses Key assumptions Key variable(s)
[1] Iwata η D is constant,  λ i MSi is ignored
[2] Bresnahan η D is constant,  λ
MSi is ignored, λ i = λ , ∀ i
[3] Panzar-Rosse η D > – 1, MSi and  H(p, Y, w)
λ i are ignored
[4] SCP η D is constant, λ is an  HHI
implicit function of HHI
[5] Cournot η D is constant, λ i is an  MSi implicit function of MSi
[6] Profit X-eff. η D is constant, λ i and MSi ε i = ν i – υ i are implicit functions of p
[7] Scale economies η D, λ and MSi are ignored Yi
[8] Scope economies for k ≠ l η D, λ and MSi are ignored Yi,k, Yi,l
[9] Efficiency η D is constant, λ i and MSi
hypothesis are implicit functions of 
p, φ = ε + (β 1 * ω )
To be sure, we have made an attempt at rewriting two classes of models so
that they can be compared to our baseline model introduced in section 3.1.
Our own main assumption in doing so is that all models discussed here share
the same features that our baseline model has. Our basic framework is a profit
maximization model, and we abstract from product differentiation. There is
the possibility of price competition and market power in outputs. However,
input markets are perfectly competitive and all banks act as price takers in
these markets. 
In addition, we have tried to stay away from defining any functional forms or
empirical specifications. We return to this issue in section 5, where we discuss
empirical evidence. For now it is important to keep in mind that: 
Proposition 1 The models described here are not nested.
In fact, models [2] and [4] are aggregate models, whereas models [1], [3] and
[5]–[9] (can) provide bank-specific estimates of market power respectively
32 Methodologyefficiency. In practice, however, models [4] and [9] are also estimated on an
aggregate level, with a single coefficient for all banks in a market. In fact, all
models focus on one or two variables. This is why, in empirical applications
we seldom find the complete specification as it was derived here. More in
general, these models may – in the way they are presented here – suffer from
identification problems, as they can perhaps also be derived using somewhat
different assumptions and a different underlying basic model. 
Proposition 2 The price elasticity of demand η D is assumed to be constant.  
The first reason for this particular feature of the models presented here is of
course the fact that they all build on pure price competition. There is no
product differentation, and all banks in a market are assumed to face the same
market demand. 
The second reason is the fact that almost all models included here share an
inherent cross-sectional nature. A prime example is model [5] (the Cournot
model) which builds on the model that Cowling (1976) and Cowling and
Waterson (1976) used for inter-industry comparisons. An exception is perhaps
model [2] (the Bresnahan model) as that usually is applied to one country. 
Proposition 3  Although price competition is assumed, output prices are
absent from almost all models.
Output prices are notoriously difficult to measure in banking. As aresult, almost
all models presented here have found ways to argue around explicitly using
prices. One obvious exception is the Bresnahan model (model [2]), which does
include prices, but only for one output (loans or deposits). Also, the Panzar-Rosse
framework (model [3]) includes revenues. This limitation has one very
important drawback, that holds particularly for the market power models ([1],
[4] and [5]): it severely restricts interpretations of tests of the null hypotheses
with respect to the existence of market power to limiting cases. Only perfect
competition and a perfectly collusive oligopoly result in values for the null
hypothesis that are easy to interpret.
39Any oligopolistic behavior that is less than
perfectly collusive will at most result in the impossibility to reject the hypothesis
that there is market power, without any measurement of market power. 
The intuition is clear: uniform price setting only occurs in both extreme cases.
In between, we need – in the absence of good output prices – a known
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39 The same holds for a monopoly (cf. the appendix).relationship between the key variable in the model and the output price vector
p in order to be able to interpret the market power tests more accurately. As
an example, consider model [5], where interpretation of  is
straightforward only in two extreme cases: the Cournot oligopoly prediction
is =1,  since  λ i = 0 and impact of MSi is exactly proportional. And in
case of perfect competition an increase in market share has no impact on
performance and since λ i = –1, this means that  = 0. However, if any
type of collusive behavior exists, λ i > 0 and the impact of market share is
more than proportional, the prediction is that  > 1. We can then only
rank predictions for  for one market over time. But we cannot (i)
compare scores across markets, or (ii) compare the magnitudes of different
predictions of  . 
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This section surveys general trends in the banking industry, particularly those
relating to competition and profitability, keeping in mind the assumptions
underlying the various approaches for measuring competition and efficiency.
This assessment of current banking market conditions enables us to evaluate
which approaches have become obsolete and which are most appropriate
today. 
In observing trends, we distinguish original causes, subsequent changes in
banking behavior and in the structure of financial markets, and final
consequences, aware all the while, that this classification may be somewhat
arbitrary.
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Table 2. Classification of trends in original causes and consequence
Causes  
•I T developments (change in production technology and distribution channels, quick
exchange of information, new products)  
• Changes in (legal) environment of banks and other financial institutions
(liberalization/deregulation, economic and financial integration within the EU,
introduction of the euro, new regulatory, tax and accounting regimes)  
Subsequent changes in banking behavior and the structure of financial markets  
• Internationalization   
•  Disintermediation (lower market shares for savings and lending, increase of other types
of banking activities)  
•  More (foreign) competition  
•  Blurring of borders (both geographically and between sectors)  
•  Concentration (mergers and acquisitions)  
•  Higher contestability  
Final consequences  
•  Lower profit margins  
•  Higher efficiency  
•  Cost reductions  
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40 For all trends described here, empirical evidence in the form of figures over the last decade
is provided by Bikker and Wesseling (2003). See also Danthine et al. (1999) and European Central
Bank (2002).4.1. Causes
4.1.1. Developments in information and financial technologies
Advances in information technologies, in particular regarding the personal
computer, software, databases and communication, have transformed banking
practices and products. Information technology has contributed to the
internationalization of the money and capital markets, to the development of
new risk management techniques and to the arrival of a spate of new complex
financial products. Furthermore, the Internet has created a world of new
challenges and threats in banking services and sales potential. Transaction
costs are substantially lower using new distribution channels such as the
Internet, encouraging banks to develop these channels further. Many banks
are cautious about these developments and are opting for a multi-channel
distribution strategy, combining the traditional ‘bricks-and-mortar’ branch
network with remote distribution channels, such as telephone banking and
internet banking. The Internet has made established markets more vulnerable
to new entrants. 
4.1.2. Liberalization and harmonization
Liberalization and harmonization in the European Union (EU), culminating in
the Second Banking Co-ordination Directive as part of the single European
market project in 1992
41 and the establishment of Economic and Monetary
Union (EMU) in 1999, have dramatically changed the financial environment
in Europe over the past decade and are expected to bring further changes in
the near future.
42 Likewise, the Riegle-Neal Act of 1994 and the gradual
repeal of the 1933 Glass-Steagall Act have drastically transformed the
banking landscape in the US. The creation of large and transparent euro
capital markets further enhanced competition in the European banking
industry and stimulated disintermediation and securitization. The
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41 This directive boosted the deregulation and liberalization of international capital flows.
Other policy initiatives were lifting of restrictions on interest payments on deposits and the
development of a harmonized framework for supervision of the European banks. In the beginning
of 1993, all formal restrictions regarding the provision of financial services across the European
Union were removed. Banks which are licensed anywhere in the Union are given a ‘single banking
licence’, which allows them to service the entire European market, either by setting up branches
in other countries or by offering products across national borders.
42 European Commission (1997) gives a detailed evaluation of the impact of the single market
programme on the performance and strategic reaction of the banking sector in European countries.
See also Molyneux and Gardner (1997), Vander Vennet (1997), Danthine et al. (1999) and Bos
(2002). For a detailed description of the economic integration in the EU, see Vanthoor (2002).comparative advantages of domestic banks on national markets for bonds and
equity in the field of underwriting and trading activities have diminished
since the euro has replaced national currencies. For similar reasons, fund
management is no longer the preserve of local financial institutions. These
contributions to international integration, together with national deregulation
and entry of new types of competitors, have boosted competition between
banks in the countries involved and will continue to do so in the years to
come. These developments contribute to further consolidation and
rationalization in the European banking sectors.
43 Moreover, EMU will also
further increase the pressure for ongoing harmonization of regulation across
EU countries, cutting down remaining obstacles to cross-border competition.
The Financial Service Action Plan of the EU (to be implemented in 2005)
seeks to finalize the integration of the EU financial markets. The new 2004
Basel Accord on capital requirements forms a new regulatory regime for
banks to enter into force by end 2006, and is another new development which
may affect competition, consolidation and efficiency in the banking industry,
though such effects are extremely difficult to predict. 
4.2. Trends
4.2.1. Internationalization
The steady development towards integrated European financial markets has
made the banking sector more international. Banks are increasingly involved in
offering financial services to foreign businesses and individuals. Although
internationalization has been a long-term trend, it has been fostered by the
introduction of the euro, for example the merging of the infrastructures for
large-value payments and interbank markets, as well as the increasing
integration of capital markets. The most visible response has been consolidation
either through mergers and acquisitions or through cross-shareholdings. Other
ways to internationalize are the development of foreign banking through direct
provision of financial services and through foreign branches. Persistent
significant differences in national legal and regulatory environments continue
to hinder cross-border mergers. Cultural factors and differences in the
framework for corporate governance also tend to discourage cross-border
consolidation. 
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43 European Commission (1997) discusses the increase of competition. Improved efficiency
has been observed by Groeneveld (1999), Altunbas et al. (2001), Maudos et al. (1999, 2001, 2002).
This is also confirmed in later sections.4.2.2. Disintermediation
Non-financial sectors in the euro area increasingly direct their savings and
surplus funds away from banks towards new forms of financial
intermediation, such as investment funds, insurance corporations and pension
funds, as well as towards the capital markets, to invest in shares or debt
instruments (as is quite common in the US). Non-financial enterprises
increasingly access the capital markets for their financing and, although still
on a limited scale, increasingly use debt securities. Underlying causes are the
development of capital markets and increased possibilities for asset
diversification (thanks to liberalization and new information technologies),
the introduction of the euro, changes in tax regulations and an increased
demand among investors for high-yield, though riskier, instruments. While
the importance of traditional banking activities (collecting deposits and
extending loans on a retail basis) has diminished in relative terms, banks still
remain the predominant players in the euro area financial system. Because the
euro area economy is dominated by small and medium-sized enterprises
(ECB, 2002), traditional bank loans, trade credits and non-listed shares, as
well as other equity, tend to be the primary sources of financing rather than
market-based financing, such as publicly listed shares and corporate debt
issuance. Moreover, despite a gradual shift towards more transaction or
deal-based banking, the relationship between banks and their corporate
customers continues to be very important in all EU countries.
Disintermediation is a relative phenomenon as bank loans, expressed as
a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP), are still increasing
substantially in most countries and regions and also in the EU as a whole. 
As a consequence of disintermediation, banks have shifted their activities
from traditional bank lending towards investment banking style activities
such as enhancing financial market intermediation by creating and selling
new capital market products or advising clients on the pricing and structuring
of a merger or acquisition. This is in turn reflected by a shift in bank revenue
flows away from interest income alone towards non-interest income such as
fees, commissions and trading profits. 
4.2.3. Concentration
Intensified competition on the financial markets, on which banks operate, has
further encouraged consolidation, for example through mergers and
acquisitions. A clear majority of M&A transactions has occurred between
banks, but financial conglomerates involving banks, insurance companies and
38 Trendssecurities firms have also been created. Domestic mergers continue to
dominate international mergers. The relatively modest volume of
international mergers could indicate that domestic banking mergers are
apparently more advantageous than international mergers. Individual
European economies are rather heterogeneous, implying that purely domestic
banking mergers offer ample opportunities for asset risk diversification.
Domestic mergers will therefore be preferred to international mergers, with
their concomitant cultural and language problems, differences in national
regulations on, for instance, deposit insurance systems, taxation differences
and country-specific restrictions on banking activities. This will discourage
cross-border consolidation. 
Concentration indices show increased concentration in almost all EU
countries, confirming the ongoing process of further consolidation in Europe,
in particular in the larger countries where consolidation was lagging behind.
While the level of concentration for the EU as a hole, though rising, is still
substantially lower than in the US, reflecting the limited level of cross-border
consolidation in Europe, the pace at which concentration is progressing is also
higher in the US than in Europe. 
4.2.4. Contestability
Banking contestability is a major condition for sound competition,
particularly where the number of banks is declining due to consolidation.
Various developments have contributed to an increase in contestability. The
EU’s single passport policy allows banks with a banking permit in one EU
country to operate in all EU countries. Low-cost distribution channels such as
the Internet enable banks to expand their activities across countries at limited
expense. Not only have geographical borders become blurred, the borders
between sectors tend to fade away. Other financial institutions, such as
insurance firms, pension funds and investment funds, have moved into the
mortgage and general lending markets, and various financial institutions can
manage private sector savings and investments. On the other hand, new
foreign entries may in price be deterred by differences in legal, tax and
regulatory regimes and in language, preferences and so on. Moreover, the
Internet may prove not to be the right medium for many banking activities
where face to face contact is important and for the many clients who rely on
more traditional distribution channels. Finally, neither foreign banks nor the
Internet have solved the problem of information asymmetry in lending to
small and medium-sized enterprises. 
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The Internet and EU liberalization and harmonization have contributed
enormously to enhancing competition among banks, particularly competition
across borders. Increased competition has also forced banks to improve their
efficiency, in order to avoid being pushed out of the market. On the other
hand, increased concentration and the enlarged market shares of major banks
may have impaired competition somewhat. As competition cannot be
measured directly (in the absence of clear prices of banking output), we have
to observe this trend of increased competition and efficiency indirectly. We
discuss a few proxies of competition and efficiency here, while the
measurement of competition and efficiency and empirical results are treated
elsewhere. 
The net interest rate margin is an interesting measure of bank profitability,
which allows comparison over time and across countries. It also reflects
competitive conditions or efficiency on the banking markets, assuming that
competition enforces efficiency and presses the margin down. Margins in
most countries fell during the last decade, indicating growing competition,
although the gradual decline in interest rates may also have contributed to
lower margins. 
Operating expenses expressed as a percentage of gross income is also often
used as a proxy of competitive conditions, although its interpretation is
somewhat ambiguous (as will be explained in section 5). This ratio tends to
fall over time, indicating lower costs compared to income. Given the falling
interest rate margins, this is remarkable, and points to cost reduction. Indeed,
the staff-costs ratio also declines over time, reflecting rationalization of bank
production. Evidently, what we observe here are the efficiency effects of
increased competitive pressure. Increased attention to share holder value may
have contributed to this trend too. 
On average across Europe, returns on assets and returns on equity – as
measures of profitability – remained roughly constant during the last decade.
This is remarkable, given the observed decline in net interest rate margins,
and reflects cost reduction and the increasing non-interest income from
non-traditional banking activities, such as asset management, the
management of stock and bond issues and trading. Returns diverged strongly
across countries, reflecting varying levels of profitability and of economic
and institutional conditions. 
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We have seen that the banking landscape has changed considerably in the last
decade. First, significant changes have occurred on the demand side. It has
become easier for customers to shop across borders, just like it has been easier
for banks to compete across borders. In addition, competition from non-bank
financial firms (insurance companies, brokerage firms, etc.) continues to have
an impact on demand, both observed and potential. As a result, the
assumption that the price elasticity of demand faced by all firms is the same
and constant over time seems more and more questionable. All models
included here have problems adjusting to this new reality. 
Second, banks themselves have reacted to changes in regulation and
(production) technology. They have branched out into new products and
become less and less like the traditional intermediaries we model them after.
What we do not know is how this process has affected bank behavior.
Reaction curves may have shifted considerably, both on a market level (λ )
and for individual banks (λ i). In what direction is uncertain and probably
depends on the individual bank. While competition may have increased on an
international level, some banks may occupy dominant positions within
national borders that allow them to react differently from their smaller
competitors. Some of the models we reviewed are theoretically able to cope
with these changes. However, as we will see in section 5, empirical
applications of these models have traditionally assumed that all banks react
similarly to each other. 
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Trend  Variable(s) affected Models most affected Explanation
[a] η D ↑ , λ i, λ [1],[2],[4],[5] and [6] All market power models 
Internationalization affected. Bos and Kolari
(2005) show that profit
X-eff [6] goes up with
internationalization.
[b]  Y [2], [7], [8] Model [2] focusses 
Disintermediation exclusively on the
loans/deposits market and
thus becomes less relevant.
Scale and scope economies
have altered.
[c] Foreign  MSi ↓ , HHI ↓ , λ ↑ [4], [5] Models [4] and [5] both 
competition assume an implicit, stable
relationship between λ and
MSi (resp. HHI)
[d] Contestability   λ ↑ , λ i ↑ all Estimates of market power
are affected, but
contestability itself is not
identified, since prices are
not available.
[e] Concentration MSi, HHI ↑ , λ , λ i [2][4] Unlike their “rival” models
[1] and [5], models [2] and
[4] assume that all banks in
a market react similarly on
increase in concentration.
[1] = Iwata; [2] = Bresnahan; [3] = Panzar-Rosse; [4] = SCP; [5] = Cournot; [6] = Profit X-eff.;
[7] = Scale economies; [8] = Scope economies; [9] = Eff. hypothesis 
Third, the markets banks operate in have themselves also changed.
Concentration has gone up in all countries and markets. This holds
particularly for retail markets, which are still predominantly national. This
has mostly plagued reduced form market structure models, such as the
Cournot model and the SCP model. In principle, we expect a decrease in
competition as a result of this increase in concentration. Other trends,
however, have opposite effects. For example, foreign banks have started to
join the ranks of banks’ traditional competitors. As a result, it is uncertain
what the effect of the increase in concentration has been on individual banks. 
With respect to the individual trends we have identified here, we find
that disintermediation undermines the Panzar-Rosse approach as the
Panzar-Rosse model is based entirely on banks’ traditional role as financial
intermediator (attracting deposits and other funds and transforming them into
loans and investments in securities). Other income from bank services and
42 Trendstrading can be incorporated into the P-R model in various ways, so that the
model continues to be useful, but less so because the model structure reflects
reality less accurately. Iwata and Bresnahan do not have this drawback for
disintermediation. 
Internationalization, foreign competition, contestability and concentration do
not generate problems for the Iwata, Bresnahan and Panzar-Rosse
approaches. The mark-up set on cost-based prices (conjectural variation,
estimated by λ ) and the interest rate revenue elasticities of input prices
(constituting H) are direct measures of competition. Observations of new (or
potential) entries, foreign competitors or competitors from other sectors are
not needed, as their effects on competition are already reflected in the
estimated measures. Of all the models that study a specific market, the
reduced-form market structure models – the SCP model in particular – are
most strongly affected by these trends, as the market structure measure has
become less and less easy to define. 
Most approaches measure the competitive position (or efficiency) of a bank
as a whole, ignoring the fact that banks produce various products and operate
on various markets. Competitive positions may differ per product or market.
An exception is the Bresnahan model which considers the competitive
position of one product (e.g. loans, deposits) and hence measures competition
on a single submarket. Approaches based on observations of individual banks
(Iwata, Panzar-Rosse, X-efficiency) can circumvent this problem somewhat,
as they distinguish various bank-size classes, operating on different markets,
e.g. small banks on local or retail markets and large banks on international or
wholesale markets (Bikker and Haaf, 2002). 
Gradual effects on competition of these (and other) trends over time can be
incorporated by using time (or trend) dependent coefficients (Bikker and
Haaf, 2002). An alternative would to split the sample into periods or separate
years. This works out well for the Panzar-Rosse and Iwata models, where
many observations provide enough information to estimate time dependent
coefficients, but not for the Bresnahan approach, where observations are
scarce owing to its aggregated level. The Bresnahan approach is based on
time series of country-specific data. Due in particular to structural changes in
banking markets over time, and also to reduced reliability of the required data
(among them, interest rates for credit loans and deposits), the estimation of
λ appears to be fairly ponderous. Empirical estimations are rare and results
are generally far from robust. The Iwata model could provide a solution, but
it is applied only once because of problems with the required data, especially
Trends 43given the lack of micro-data for the structure of cost and production for
homogeneous products offered by a large number of players in the European
banking markets. 
The major problem presented by the efficiency models discussed here is the
fact that their outcomes are very difficult to validate. We have no sound
theory that tells us what is the correct distribution of the efficiency term, and
we know very little about the economic validity of our efficiency scores. In
particular, and related to increasing internationalization, contestability and
foreign competition, it is hazardous to transpose best-practice in one
country/market to another country/market. 
To conclude, it would seem that these trends have similar consequences for
most banks. Increases in competition result in lower profit margins, higher
cost efficiency and lower profit efficiency. In absolute levels, we also expect
cost reductions. The dynamics of the consolidation process, however, may
have increased the volatility of earnings. 
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This section presents the empirical applications of two of the models
reviewed in section 3 (the Panzar-Rosse model of market power and the
X-efficiency model of managerial ability) in light of the trends described in
section 4. Moreover, it surveys a number of well-known simple proxies of
competition and efficiency, both across countries and over time, and
compares them with the model-based estimates. 
5.1. Bank’s Market Power: the Panzar-Rosse Model
The Panzar-Rosse model provides a method for measuring market power, in
which a bank’s interest income depends in part on input prices (Bikker and
Groeneveld, 2000; Bikker and Haaf, 2002). This dependency is described by the
H parameter, representing the sum of all input price elasticities, which permits
various types of market structure to be distinguished. The first of these is perfect
competition (H= 0), amarket type in which interest income moves up and down
in proportion to input prices. Perfect competition will prevent excessive profits,
so that banks must on-charge any rise in input prices in order to prevent losses,
while they must match any fall in input prices by a decrease in output prices,
because competitors will do likewise. The second market type is monopoly or
perfect collusion, in which the bank or the cartel chooses prices that yield
maximum profits. Under perfect collusion, the relation between output and
input processes is absent or negative (so that H≤ 0): any input price rise will eat
into the monopoly’s profits and vice versa. The third market type, monopolist
competition, is found especially frequently in the financial sector. Competition
may be eased to some extent as products and services differ from those of other
banks, at least in (minor) details. Under monopolist competition, or oligopoly,
there is some correlation between input and output prices, but it is less than
proportional (0 < H < 1). Thus H, in this model, is a measure of competition. 
Table 4 presents estimates of H for a number of European and non-European
countries based on three input prices: funding rate, personnel expenses and
other expenses.
44 It also shows the average of H for 23 OECD countries. The
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44 Empirical results in this article are based on balance sheet data and profit and loss accounts
taken from Bankscope (Fitch-IBCA), unless otherwise indicated. Wherever possible, figures have
been adjusted for national differences in accounting rules and possible (input) errors. Our own
calculations show that more recent estimates yield very similar results. Apparently, changes over
time are limited.first column provides estimates for all banks. Notably, of the 23 national
banking markets taken as a whole, none is a pure monopoly or cartel, nor is
any one of them characterized by perfect competition. Apparently, all national
banking markets considered are characterized by either oligopoly or
monopolist competition. This result tallies with those of the SCP analysis,
which in most cases also point to a degree of market power (Bos, 2004).
Competition turns out to be more pronounced in Europe (0.73) than elsewhere
(0.64). Notably, Germany and the Anglo-Saxon countries appear to be lagging
behind in this respect. Germany and the US have banking markets that are
less consolidated, with large numbers of small banks targeting local markets
where they meet limited competition. This is reflected by low average
competition estimates: 0.63 and 0.56, respectively. 
Table 4. Estimates of H for different bank sizes
All banks  Small  Medium  Large  
Austria 0.87  0.93 0.89 0.91   
Belgium 0.89  0.95 0.88 0.88   
Denmark  0.36 0.34 0.75 1.16
Finland 0.78  0.67 0.76 0.70   
France  0.70 0.59 0.79 0.89
Germany  0.63 0.59 0.70 1.03
Greece  0.76 0.41 0.66 0.94
Ireland 0.65  0.99 0.63  0.93
Italy  0.82 0.75 0.86 0.81   
Luxembourg  0.93 0.94 0.95 0.91   
Netherlands 0.75  0.74 0.87  0.95
Norway  0.77 0.80 0.75 0.71   
Portugal  0.83 0.84 0.84 0.91   
Spain  0.62 0.64 0.59 0.66   
Sweden  0.80 0.84 0.76 0.95
Switzerland 0.58  0.54  0.92 1.01
United  Kingdom  0.64 0.41 0.85 1.20   
Australia 0.57  -0.14 0.70 0.68   
Canada  0.62 0.74 0.63 0.60   
Japan 0.54  0.43 0.11 0.61   
New Zealand  0.86  —  1.13 0.86  
South Korea  0.68  —  0.72 0.77
US  0.56 0.62 0.54 0.72   
Averages  0.70 0.65 0.75 0.86   
Minimum 0.36  -0.14  0.11  0.60   
Maximum 0.93 0.99 1.13 1.20   
Average  European  0.73 0.70 0.79 0.91   
Avg.  non-European  0.64 0.41 0.64 0.71   
Source: Bikker and Haaf (2002). Explanation: italics indicate monopoly or perfect cartel,
boldface indicates perfect competition. Data relates to 1997. 
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by customer (private consumers; small and medium-sized businesses; large,
international concerns), by product (savings; mortgage loans; business credit;
capital market services), and by service area (local; national; international).
Table 1 takes a first step towards segmentation of the banking market by size,
distinguishing small banks, operating mostly locally and targeting the retail
market; large banks operating internationally and mostly targeting large
companies; and medium-sized banks taking up an intermediate position
(columns 2–4). Obviously, this distinction provides only an approximative
understanding of competitive conditions in the submarkets. 
As expected, small banks generally face milder than average competition:
apparently, the retail segment of local markets is competed for less
energetically (with H values averaging 0.65). In only seven countries is
perfect competition probable (boldface in table 4). Only for Australia, do the
results for small banks point to monopoly or perfect cartel (italics in table 4).
Large banks operate in a markedly more competitive environment, in which
counterparties are more powerful and foreign banks participate as well (with
H values averaging 0.86). In this sector, the results for many more countries
point to perfect competition. Values of H greater than 1 – as found for large
banks in Denmark and the UK – are an indication that banks co-operate and
apply strategic pricing methods, taking into account the manner in which they
expect competitors to respond to their prices. Medium-sized banks again take
up an intermediate position. 
5.2. Efficiency and market power
In an attempt to acquire a firmer grip on measuring banks’ performance,
researchers have increasingly sought to analyse, in addition to banks’ actual
performance (profit), their potential performance. Standard microeconomic
theory states that in a market characterised by perfect competition, no bank
will be able to make excessive profits. On a more general level, a bank – in
the absence of other causes of market power – can only achieve above
average profit efficiency if its cost efficiency is above average as well. An
important underlying idea here is that under conditions of perfect competition
(ideal for consumers) banks will be forced to minimize their cost levels as
much as they can so as not to be pushed out of the market. Where there is
market power, banks may succeed in making higher profits without having to
cut down on costs. In such conditions, excess profits are realised through
price increases. The extent to which profits may be raised this way depends
Empirical Evidence 47on competitors’response, but also on the response of the consumer. Hence the
performance of banks in a certain market segment is explained partly by
internal factors such as proper management, but partly also by market
conditions. Because internal and external factors influence each other, it is
difficult to distinguish managerial competence from market conditions. 
A bank with a degree of market power ceases to be a price taker and may
increase its profits by raising its prices (higher profit efficiency) without
having to lower its costs (unchanged cost efficiency). Such market power may
have been created by the existence of a monopoly, through co-operation
(oligopoly), by economies of scale, allowing large banks to produce more
than smaller banks under similar cost conditions, or as a result of product
diversification. 
A banking market may therefore be characterized by measuring the
performances of the banks in that market. Performance, here meaning the
relative ability of a bank to minimize costs or maximize profits, is measured
by comparing the costs or profits of a bank to those of the best performing
bank of the same size (eliminating scale effects), taking into account any
differences in input prices and product range. These differences in
performance are expressed in terms of ‘X-efficiency’and may be attributed to
the quality of banks’ management. 
For the estimation of the cost and profit frontier functions, a translog
functional form is commonly used. This form allows for the necessary
flexibility when estimating frontier models. Berger and Mester (1997) have
compared the translog to the Fourier Flexible Form (FFF). Despite the
latter’s added flexibility, the difference in results between these methods
appears to be negligible (see also Swank (1996)). Moreover, previously cited
bank efficiency studies have shown that the translog cost and profit functions
are locally stable in large bank applications. 
Usually, profit is taken before tax (PBT), Y stands for outputs, and W stands
for input prices.
45 Also, the control variable equity (Z) reflects differences in
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45 With respect to notation, we use lower case symbols in italics to denote logarithms. Upper
case symbols represent actual values of the variables. Note that although the translog (and
comparable functional forms) has many advantages, for profit functions it has a considerable
drawback: it cannot handle banks with negative profit very well. In the literature, either these
observations are deleted, or – before taking logs – the minimum profit (i.e. the maximum loss in
the sample) plus one is added to each bank’s profits. Whereas the former solution results in sample
bias, the latter results in a nonneutral transformation. In Bos et al. (2004), alternativerisk-taking behavior. In the typical specification below, the optimal profit
level for bank k in period t is now a function of the number of outputs, input
prices, and the control variable Z. In a three-input, three-output translog
setting, u and v are the inefficiency and random error terms, respectively, and
aj, ajk, bj, bjk, cj, dj, djk, ej, fj, gj, and hj are parameters:
(24)
Duality requires the imposition of symmetry and linear homogeneity in input
prices to estimate our cost and profit models (see Beattie and Taylor (1985)
and Lang and Welzel (1999)): 
Linear homogeneity in input prices should be imposed by normalizing the
dependent variable and all input price variables (W) before taking logarithms
(see Coelli, Prasado Rao, and Battese (1998)).
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Bikker (2002) performed such a measurement exercise for banks in European
countries, determining their cost efficiencies.
47 This study compared
European banks to their best-practice banks – an exercise of crucial
importance for cross-border comparisons. Many studies in this area have been
single-country studies, comparing banks to their own national champion
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transformation with less problems is suggested. Losses are modelled as a netput, and a negative
profit variable is constructed. For banks that exhibit positive profits, this variable has a value of
one. However, for banks exhibiting negative profits, the left-hand-side is substituted with this
value of one and the absolute value of these negative profits is included in the negative profit
variable on the right-hand side. Three different checks supported this approach: (i) banks with
positive profits were on average more efficient; (ii) the coefficient for our negative profit variable
was negative; (iii) there were extremely high correlations of the levels and ranks of efficiency of
the banks with positive profits for the specifications with and without the negative profit variable.
46 Each of these variables is included as a ratio to one of the input price variables, and the
coefficient for each input price is inferred ex post from the imposed restriction. This procedure
only ensures homogeneity of degree one in factor prices. Imposing constant returns to scale would
require normalization of the output variables as well.
47 Relatively little research has been done in the field of international comparisons. Exceptions
are Pastor et al. (1997), Altunbas et al. (2001), Bikker (2001) and Maudos et al. (1999, 2001 and
2002).performers only. As these national champions lag farther and farther behind
the European champions, however, the local (lagging) banking sector will
continue to compare itself favourably with ever less justification. The present
multi-country study lacks this problem. 
Table 5 presents efficiency estimates for the EU countries plus Switzerland.
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On average, cost efficiency turns out to be rather low at 70%, at least
compared to studies on US banks, indicating an 80% average efficiency.
Lower results were found by many other studies for European countries,
although some of the different model specifications used in other studies have
produced higher efficiency percentages. The results suggest that on average,
banks in Europe are lagging far behind their best performing peers.
Differences between countries also appear to be rather large. Banks in
Germany, Luxembourg and Switzerland, with efficiencies averaging 70%,
lead the European pack, while banks in Spain, Belgium and Greece trail
behind with average efficiencies below 55%. Higher efficiency estimates for
banks in Luxembourg and Switzerland are somewhat misleading, as they do
not necessarily reflect better managerial performance but are produced by
special circumstances including bank secrecy, zero tax rates for foreigners
and stable local currencies, which make it easier to attract (foreign)
investment at low cost. 
The efficiency ranking of national markets does not always correspond to
expectations. Germany, with its low level of banking market consolidation
and high level of government interference, is often regarded as a less efficient
banking market. Similar reasons, in combination with economic
developments that lag behind in certain respects, have led to lower a priori
estimates of efficiency with regard to France and Southern European
countries, as well. In this respect, the ranking of Belgium in table 5 is lower
than expected, while those of Italy and Portugal are higher than expected. The
UK, too, turns out to be less competitive than some observers think. On
further analysis, however, rankings turn out differently as more factors are
taken into consideration, especially if the distribution of a country’s banks
across each banking category is taken into account. Then it becomes clear that
on account of their simplified structures, savings and co-operative banks tend
to be relatively inefficient. The effects of differences in managerial
competence on cost differences turn out to be less strong. On the other hand,
universal banks tend to be less efficient as a result of their more complex
structures and concomitant management problems. 
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48 Austria was left out for lack of sufficient data.The last column of table 5 presents averages of country rankings based on
efficiency estimates per banking category, with e.g. savings banks being
compared only to best-practice savings banks etc. This leads to a dramatic
shift in position for Germany, where more than 90 per cent of the banks are
of the co-operative and savings bank type: plain banking institutions, whose
inefficiency is limited. This strong concentration of relatively efficient
cooperative and savings banks in Germany results in a high average level of
efficiency. However, within these categories – and among the other categories
– German banks are not the most efficient ones. After adjustment for this
category effect, German efficiency turns out to be just slightly above average
(5th instead of 1st, see the last column of table 5). A similar bias appears to
have crept in in the case of Italy and Spain where, respectively, 73 per cent
and 64 per cent of banks are co-operative and savings banks. For the Dutch
banks, 78 per cent of which are commercial banks, we see a landslide ranking
shift in the opposite direction. Commercial banks have, on average, high
inefficiencies but in relative terms the Dutch commercial banks are among the
most efficient. After adjustment, Dutch banks rank 3rd instead of 8th.
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49Acaveat in interpreting these results is our implicit assumption that different types of banks
operate in the same environment, have the same production sets and share a similar production
technology (i.e. a single frontier)
Table 5. Estimates of X-efficiency using the SCF model (1990–1997)
Countries Obs.  Efficiency  Ranking  #1  Ranking  #2
Belgium 44  0.48  14  13   
Denmark 57  0.54  13  12   
Finland
* 13 0.68  5  9   
France 964  0.55  12  10   
Germany  2 983  0.76  1  5  
Greece 40  0.40  15  15   
Ireland
* 20 0.70  4  4   
Italy  1 221  0.60  10  11  
Luxembourg 177  0.72  2  1   
Netherlands 164  0.62  8  3   
Portugal 67  0.65  6  8   
Spain 105  0.58  11  14   
Sweden
* 17 0.62  9  7   
Switzerland 299  0.71  3  2   




Asterisks refer to countries with a (too) limited number of observations. Ranking #1 is unweighted
ranking. Ranking #2 is based on weighted average of category related rankings, see Bikker (2002).5.3. Efficiency of large banks compared internationally
The interest of researchers has concentrated mostly on the largest banks, both
because they are economic heavyweights and because international
competition makes them easier to compare with one another. The present
section therefore shifts its attention to an international comparison of large
banks in Europe and the US. Also, profit efficiency is considered in addition
to cost efficiency. A result often found is that differences in cost efficiency
(measured in percentages) tend to be significantly smaller than differences in
profit efficiency (Berger et al., 1993; Berger and Humphrey, 1997). Note,
however, that a relatively small reduction in costs may take away a large share
of profit inefficiency. The difference between cost and profit efficiency may
also be explained in part by the fact that profit efficiency is determined to
a much larger extent than cost efficiency by conditions of the market in which
a bank operates, because the pricing levels a bank can afford to use have an
immediate effect on profit maximisation. Also, profit is more volatile than
costs, so that percentage differences between profit and profit efficiencies of
banks are larger than in the case of costs. In sum, examining profit efficiency
can result in additional evidence on the nature of the competition in a banking
market. 
Figure 1 shows average efficiencies of large banks with world-wide
operations, by country and weighted for banks’ total assets.
50 The absolute
champions turn out to be banks in Ireland, the Netherlands and the USA, in
terms of both cost and profit efficiency. The surprisingly low marks scored by
Luxembourg and Austria may be less reliable, because the number of large
banks in these countries is small. Profit efficiency, varying between 0.52 and
0.87, is much more widely spread than cost efficiency (0.88–0.98).
51 The
difference in spread is caused in large part by national differences in market
conditions. To the extent that profit efficiency is determined by local market
conditions, such as the existence of market power or institutional conditions,
the same efficiency is unlikely to be ‘exported’ entirely when banks spread
their wings across national borders. For this reason, a Dutch or Irish bank
starting operations in Germany, Belgium or Austria (as through a takeover)
will probably find it more difficult to attain the same profit levels abroad that
it has been used to at home. 
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50 Data on independent institutions over the 1995–99 period. Source of data on European
banks: BankScope. Source of data on US banks: Federal Reserve Call Reports.
51 Cost efficiency is much higher here than it is in the estimates of section 5.2. This is because
only large, international banks are considered, as appears also from the calculations underlying
figure 1 in the next section. Also, a different model specification is used here.Figure 1: Profit and cost efficiency of large banks (Bos and Kolari (2005))
A comparison of large banks’rankings in figure 1 with the rankings of all (or
average) banks in table 5 confirms the relative efficiency of Dutch, Irish,
Swiss and Swedish banks, while French, Danish and Belgian banks again
come out as being less efficient. Notably, large banks in Italy, Spain and
Greece, in their ability to keep pace with the most efficient large banks in
Europe, stand out favourably among the other banks in those countries. 
Of course, banks may be relatively X-efficient, but operate at a suboptimal
size or with a suboptimal output-mix. Although Berger and Humphrey (1991)
report that scale and scope economies are less important than X-efficiency, it
may be worthwhile to investigate how the large European and US banks
described above compare. As explained in section 3.3.2, output-specific
economies of scale are calculated by taking the derivative of the profit (or
cost) model with respect to a firm’s output. Bos and Kolari (2005) also
calculate scope economies for their sample of large European and US banks.
On the cost side, overall scale economies for European and US banks are





























0.87 0.89 0.91 0.93 0.95 0.97 0.99
Cost  efficiency
Profit efficiencyin total output results in an increase in total costs of almost 1.13 USD. These
differences are significant, even though they only include large banks (over
1 bn USD). On the profit side, scale economies are 1.151 for European banks
and 1.099 for US banks, again significantly different. Scope economies differ
even more. Using the measure described in section 3.3.2, cost scope
economies are –0.340 and –1.024 respectively for European and US banks.
So, specialized banks face lower costs, both in Europe and the US (although
scope economies for European banks are not significantly different from
zero). On the profit side, the same picture emerges with scope economies of
0.367 and 0.950 respectively for European and US banks. Our conclusion is
that in terms of scale and scope economies, although economically less
important than X-efficiency, considerable differences continue to exist
between banks in different markets, even if we only consider a relatively
homogenous sample of large commercial banks. 
5.4. National differences in market conditions
As noted above, it is useful, in comparing banks’efficiency internationally, to
establish to what extent market conditions and regulatory environments differ
from country to country. Together, these variables determine, for a given
country, the maximum possible efficiency levels for banks of a given size,
known technically as the efficiency frontier. Efficiency frontiers estimated for
individual countries, on the basis of the best-performing banks, permit
efficiency levels to be compared within each country but not, of course,
between countries, because efficiency is measured as the distance vis-à-vis
the best-performing banks, whose performances vary from country to
country. However, a joint efficiency frontier estimated for a group of banks in
several countries does permit international comparison of efficiency levels,
although efficiency levels of individual banks’ may be distorted through
disregard of national or market-specific factors. As a result, banks in some
countries may appear extremely inefficient, because they are compared to
unrealistic optimum levels. To resolve this problem, one may employ an
estimation technique by which a so-called meta frontier is construed on the
basis of country-specific efficiency frontiers, i.e. the best-performing banks
(see Bos and Schmiedel, 2003). The meta frontier technique takes account of




52 With a pooled frontier, banks in all countries are assumed to face a frontier with the same
shape. The shapes of country-specific frontiers can differ, but efficiency scores cannot be Figure 2: From a pooled frontier to a meta frontier
Figure 2, taken from Bos and Schmiedel (2003), also compares banks in
several countries.
53 In contrast to figure 1, which only looks at large banks
(including US banks), this figure represents all banks, illustrating how
relative cost and profit efficiencies change if a meta frontier is estimated
instead of the one-size-fits-all pooled model used in figure 1. The most
notable change is the increase, for almost every country, of average cost and
profit efficiencies, owing to the apparent divergence of national efficiency
frontiers. The odd one out amid this pattern of increasing efficiencies is
Germany, where both cost and profit efficiencies decline. This is all the more
notable because both types of efficiency, but especially profit efficiency were
already low to begin with. Indeed, the analysis shows that even the most
efficient German banks are relatively inefficient compared to other European
banks. These low efficiency levels also play a part, of course, in the recently
rekindled debate on the efficiency of the German banking system. Another
remarkable result is the particularly strong increase in both cost and profit
efficiencies of banks in Belgium, Italy and the Netherlands. This result
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compared between banks operating under different frontiers. With a meta-frontier,
linear-programming is used to create an envelope (or umbrella) around country-specific frontiers.
This way, the shape of these country-specific frontiers can differ, but – depending on how closely
the meta-frontier envelops these frontiers – efficiency estimates from these country-specific
frontiers can be compared.
53 Asset-weighted averages for 1993–2000.
 
 
 demonstrates that the national efficiency frontiers for banks in these countries
are still considerably higher than for banks in other European countries. By
consequence, the efficiency of banks in these countries is probably
underestimated (more strongly than elsewhere) when compared to a pooled
frontier instead of a meta frontier. 
The shifts observed in figure 2 also explain the almost complete absence of
cross-border bank mergers and takeovers within the EU. Apparently,
successes realised domestically are difficult to repeat abroad. Another notable
point is that successful cost management does not lead automatically to
greater profit efficiency and, by consequence, to higher profits. Belgian
banks, for instance, although they have the highest average cost efficiency,
are relatively less efficient in turning this into profits than e.g. their Dutch or
British competitors. It is unclear what causes these differences. Perhaps
average managerial capabilities differ significantly from country to country;
another possibility is that further integration is impeded by national
differences in market and regulatory conditions. 
5.5. Competition and efficiency in 2003
Table 6 provides figures for EU countries of a number of well-known and
often used simple measures or proxies of competition and efficiency for 2003,
namely return on equity (ROE), return on assets (ROA), the ratio of operating
(non-interest-rate) expenses to gross income (or cost-income ratio), the
interest rate margin ratio,
54 and an index of concentration, based on total
assets.
55 Note that competition and efficiency are often seen as near
synonyms, in the sense that strong competition leads to efficiency. These
measures are also linked to profitability in the sense that high competition
tends to reduce profitability, whereas high efficiency may improve
profitability. For the sake of comparison, table 6 also gives a number of
model-based estimates of competition and efficiency, based on data over,
roughly, the last decade. These estimates are Panzar and Rosse’s H-value of
competition (Bikker and Haaf, 2002), a few measures based on cost
56 Empirical Evidence
54 Source: for 1993–2001, OECD (2000, 2002), Bank Profitability; Financial Statements of
Banks, OECD, Paris. Figures for 2002 and 2003 are based on own calculations using Fitch/IBCA
figures.
55 Source for the EU: own calculations based on ‘ECB working group on developments in
banking, Review of structural developments in the EU banking sector year 2003’, and earlier
reports. Figures for the US and Japan are based on own calculations using Fitch/IBCA figures.









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 X-efficiency (Bikker, 2002) and Bresnahan’s λ of conjectural variation for,
respectively, loan and deposit markets (Bikker, 2003). The variable
“efficiency ranking” (a weighted average of rankings of efficiency) takes the
distribution of a country’s banks across bank categories into account, which
is much more precise when efficiency differs substantially across bank types
(see section 5.2 or Bikker, 2002). 
The interpretations of most measures are quite obvious. Strong competition
(and high efficiency) reduces ROE, ROA and the interest rate margin ratio
and competition is expected to be stronger, the lower the concentration is.
While Panzar and Rosse’s H-value is a measure of competition,
Bresnahan’s λ reflects market power. As strong competition forces high
efficiency, the measures correlate with efficiency in a similar manner as with
competition. ROE, ROAand the interest rate margin ratio are also proxies for
profitability. The meaning of the cost-income ratio, however, is not wholly
unambiguous. A high ratio is usually assumed to indicate high efficiency,
(forced by) strong competition and (as a result) a low profit rate (focussing on
low profits). This interpretation supposes that bank service tariffs, such as
lending rates,
56 commissions and fees, are dictated by competition and hence
that, given the output level, revenues are a residual item. An alternative view
focuses on costs instead of profits and assumes that competition causes
relatively low costs (reflecting high efficiency), whereas profits may be seen
as accidental or determined by external factors. This would, for instance, be
the case if bank service tariffs were determined by a mark-up on costs.
57 Our
empirical analyses reveal that the first interpretation – and the most common
one – appears to be most plausible, at least for 2003. Note that all (simple)
measures are rough approximations at best. ROE, ROA and the interest rate
margin ratio, for instance may be distorted by the composition of assets and
liabilities, differences in the yield curve between the countries considered, the
relative size of equity capital and book-keeping operations, which lengthen or
shorten the balance sheet. 
Table 6 also presents rankings for each measure, where low values indicate
high competition and efficiency. It is clear that rankings and patterns in the
figures are often rather similar across the five simple proxies, but that large
deviations also occur. For some countries it is clear that the results reflect
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56 And hence interest margins when funding costs are given.
57 Note that a ratio would be meaningless if the profit margin were proportional to costs (as in
the case of a mark-up in terms of a percentage of costs) because the ratio would be constant. The
first view assumes that profits are – strongly – negatively correlated with costs, whereas the
second assumes that profits are uncorrelated or less than proportionally related to costs.their particular position, see, for instance, Luxembourg where many banks are
subsidiaries of foreign banks, taking advantage of bank secrecy and tax
benefits. Table 8 gives correlations between the measures. Boxes indicate
where negative correlations are expected, given the interpretation (or
definition) of the measures. Generally high and significant correlations
between these proxies confirm that the respective figures are rather similar.
Whereas the efficiency measures correlate significantly with some of the
proxies, including ROA and the interest rate margin, the P-R measure does
not correlate significantly with any of them. Bresnahan figures for deposit and
loan markets are available for a limited number of countries only, due to data
constraints. Nevertheless, they correlate significantly with many of the other
measures.
58
The last column of table 6 gives an average of the various rankings and, in
a very simple manner, reflects the respective information contained in the
earlier measures. Surprisingly, this overall measure correlates significantly
with all the measures (except Bresnahan’s). The variable net interest rates
comes closest to this averal average measure. Banks in France, Germany and,
in particular, Southern European countries, such as Greece, Italy, Portugal and
Spain, are sometimes seen as less efficient (and the banking markets in these
countries as less competitive).
59 The rankings we find here do not at all
coincide with such ‘accepted wisdom’. 
5.6. Changes in competition and efficiency over time
Table 7 provides similar figures as table 6, but with simple proxies based on
averages over the last 10 years, which makes them more comparable with the
model-based measures which are also based on, say, the last decade. The
results in this table differ significantly from those in the preceding one. The
correlations between the simple proxies are much weaker and less often
significant (see the lower part of table 8). The net interest margin is
significantly correlated with ROA only, and concentration is uncorrelated
62 Empirical Evidence
58 The cross correlations with Bresnahan’s measures may be less reliable due to the limited
number (of countries) of the respective series.
59 Arguments for the alleged diverging level of efficiency are more severe regulation by the
supervisory authorities, interference by local government in the German Länder, which reduces
competition, financial conservatism, a low level of consolidation and an extended network of
branches (Germany), strong direct interference by the government (France and Italy) and lagging
economic development (Greece, Spain, Portugal). Banks in the UK are often seen as more
advanced and exposed to stronger competition.with any of the other measures. The P-R measure is only correlated
significantly with the net interest rate margin. The net interest rate margin also
remains the proxy which is most similar to the efficiency ranking. The
cost-income ratio is not correlated with most of the other measures neither
with the ‘average ranking’. This suggests that this ratio is a rather unreliable
indicator of competition and inefficiency, possibly as a consequence of its
ambiguous interpretation. The ROA is the best proxy, in that it has the
strongest correlation with the ‘average ranking’. The country rankings do not
differ much from table 6, apart from the Netherlands (from 11 to 6) and
Ireland (from 6 to 12). The main conclusion is that, apparently, the 10 year
averages of the simple proxies and the model-based measures are too
one-dimensional. They only offer a partial explanation for the degree of
competition and efficiency. The data itself do not shed much light on the
question which measure outperforms the others. 
A commonly held view holds that deregulation, liberalization and
technological innovation during the last decade have strengthened national
and international competition. For the EU, this process was reinforced by
progressive financial and monetary integration. The resulting increased
competition forces banks to become ever more efficient. The question arises
whether these changes are expressed in competition and efficiency estimates.
Figure 3: IRM of 5 large EU countries (in %)







































































Empirical Evidence 63Figure 4: C/I of 5 large EU countries (in %)
Sources: for 1990–2001: OECD; for 2002–2003: own calculations based on Fitch-IBCA.
Figure 5: ROA of 5 large EU countries (in %)










































































































































64 Empirical EvidenceFigure 6: ROE of 5 large EU countries (in %)
Sources: for 1990–2001: OECD; for 2002–2003: own calculations based on Fitch-IBCA.
Figure 7: CR5 of 5 large EU countries (in %)






















































































































Empirical Evidence 65Figure 8: IRM of the EU, the US and Japan (in %)
Sources: for 1990–2001: OECD; for 2002–2003: own calculations based on Fitch-IBCA. 
EU is the equity-weighted average over EU countries.
Figure 9: C/I of the EU, the US and Japan (in %)
Sources: for 1990–2001: OECD; for 2002–2003: own calculations based on Fitch-IBCA.






































































































































66 Empirical EvidenceFigure 10: ROA of the EU, the US and Japan (in %)
Sources: for 1990–2001: OECD; for 2002–2003: own calculations based on Fitch-IBCA.
EU is the equity-weighted average over EU countries.
Figure 11: ROE of the EU, the US and Japan (in %)
Sources: for 1990–2001: OECD; for 2002–2003: own calculations based on Fitch-IBCA.








































































































































Empirical Evidence 67Table 9 provides changes over time for the simple proxies and for
Panzar-Rosse’s H value. Moreover, figures 3–7 present these simple proxies
for the period 1994-2003 for the four largest countries plus the Netherlands
and figures 8–11 present the first four proxies for the EU, the US and Japan.
In the early 1990s, ROE, ROA and the net interest rate margin in the
Scandinavian countries were affected particularly severely by the banking
crises. Since this would distort any comparison over time, we ignore these
countries. We than observe that ROE and the net interest rate margin tend to
decrease over time in most countries and also ‘on average’, which may reflect
intensified competition although this downward trend could also be due in
part to the fall in interest rates over time. The cost-income ratio also fell
somewhat over the years, reflecting cost reduction (in order to improve
shareholder value) but also – relatively – higher profits. Strong differences
across countries exist (cf. figure 4). ROA increased over time, reflecting –
given decreased interest rate margins – higher profits on non-traditional
banking services. The concentration figures reflect the gradually increased
concentration for many countries. The 1997, H indices (see the discussion
around table 10) are compared to H indices for 1991. Given the dramatic
changes in the banking market over the past decade, one would expect to see
competition levels increase significantly. Yet in fact while the level of
competition did increase in many countries and in various sub-sectors, the
differences as expressed by the H statistic, though significant, remain limited
in size. Possibly, this is because banks manage to mitigate increasing
competitive pressures to some extent, by oligopolistic behavior or by product
differentiation (for which the present framework is not very well suited). 
Next, we look at annual cost efficiency changes over the 1990–1997 period.
Amid growing competition awareness in banks, caused in part by rising levels
of competition, one would expect to see cost efficiency increase over time.
Table 10 shows that this is indeed the case, as indicated by a consistent
Table 10. Changes in efficiency over time
No. of banks  Efficiency
1990 31  0.563
1991 52  0.543
1992 220  0.563
1993 364  0.564
1994 515  0.590
1995 1  126  0.653
1996 2  135  0.733
1997 1  907  0.739
Source: Bikker (2002) 
68 Empirical Evidenceyear-on-year rise in efficiency levels of EU banks over the 1991–1997 period.
Whereas in 1990, average efficiency lagged considerably behind that of US
banks, seven years on, inefficiency levels had fallen by as much as 45 per
cent, significantly reducing the efficiency lag. This suggests major
contributions made by deregulation and economic and financial integration
within Europe to the wealth of both customers and owners of banks. As
demonstrable increases in competition levels are limited, it follows that
competition was not the impelling force driving efficiency improvements.
Therefore, other factors must have contributed as well, as, for instance,
increased concern for profitability or shareholder value. 
5.7. Synthesis
In this section, we have reviewed empirical applications of the models
derived in section 3. In light of the evidence presented here, a relatively clear
picture emerges. 
Although we have emphasized the many different ways we can look at
competition and profitability, most performance measures reviewed here tell
a fairly similar story. However, there are two major exceptions. First, the
cost/income ratio is not correlated with other measures: competitive
conditions have much more of an impact on the revenue side. In addition,
relative performance as measured by cost X-efficiency does correlate with
most other performance measures, and it has shown a marked decrease over
time. Savings and co-operative banks are relatively efficient. These plain
banks tend to perform the traditional intermediary role that is assumed in
most of the models reviewed here. With increasing disintermediation, the
question arises as to how to interpret this result. 
Second, the Panzar-Rosse model indicates that competition has increased
over the period reviewed here. Some other evidence, however, points in other
directions: returns (ROA and ROE) have increased, and concentration has
gone up. At the same time, the interest rate margin has fallen somewhat in the
same period. The Panzar-Rosse model may have picked up the effects of
internationalization that are less apparent in other measures. 
Country comparisons show that there are still marked differences between
countries. Thus, controlling for country-specific circumstances appears to still
be crucial in comparative studies. This point is also made when the
meta-frontier technique is applied to European countries: markets may have
Empirical Evidence 69become more contestable and foreign competition may have increased, but
this does not mean that performance (both absolute and relative) is easily
exported across national borders. 
However, relative performance, as measured by X-efficiency, can shed some
light on the (differences in) competitive conditions in different countries.
From our comparison of cost and profit X-efficiency, we observe that there is
no clear correlation between the two measures. In some countries, a high
profit efficiency is accompanied by a high cost efficiency, whereas this is not
the case in other countries. Thus, efficiency may be useful as an indirect
measure of market power.
70 Empirical Evidence6. Conclusions
This paper derives nine approaches to measuring competition and efficiency
from a single theoretical profit maximizing framework, assuming that these
models share the same features that our baseline model has. The major
conclusion is that all models focus on a single variable instead of a set of
variables as theory prescribes. For this reason, all models may suffer from
identification problems in the sense that they pick up market power when
estimating efficiency and vice versa. Also contributing to this problem is the
measurement of input and output prices in banking. These problems may
explain why the various approaches result in such diverging outcomes. 
The banking landscape has changed considerably over the last decade. First,
demand is affected by foreign competition and competition from non-bank
financial firms. This calls into question the underlying assumption that the
price elasticity of demand faced by all firms is the same and constant over
time. Second, banks have reacted to changes in regulation and production
technology. They have branched out into new products and behave less like
the traditional intermediaries we model them after. Reaction curves may have
shifted considerably, both on the market level and for individual banks.
Although competition has intensified internationally, some banks may occupy
dominant positions within national borders that allow them to react
differently than their smaller competitors. Some of the models we reviewed
are theoretically unable to cope with these changes, as they have traditionally
assumed that all banks react similarly to each other. Third, the markets banks
operate in have also changed as e.g. concentration has gone up, which may
weaken competition. But foreign competition has intensified, so that it is
uncertain what, on balance, the effects on individual banks have been. 
Most approaches ignore the fact that banks produce various products and
operate on various markets, where competitive positions may differ per
product or market. An exception is the Bresnahan model, which considers
competition on one submarket (e.g. loans, deposits). Approaches based on
bank observations (Iwata, Panzar-Rosse) can circumvent this problem
distinguishing various bank-size classes linked to different markets, e.g. small
banks on local or retail markets and large banks on international or wholesale
markets (Bikker and Haaf, 2002). Where ample observations are available,
gradual effects on competition of the trends over time should be incorporated
by using time (or trend) dependent coefficients (Bikker and Haaf, 2002).
71Structural changes in banking markets and the lack of reliability of the data
(particularly interest rates for credit loans and deposits) reduce the reliability
of the estimates of the Bresnahan approach. 
One notable problem for the efficiency models discussed here is the fact that
their outcomes are very difficult to validate. There is no sound theory
providing the correct distribution of the efficiency term, and we know little
about the economic validity of the efficiency scores. Particularly with
increasing internationalization, contestability and foreign competition, it is
hazardous to transpose best practices in one country or market to another. All
in all, we expect that the observed trends have similar consequences for most
banks: increases in competition result in lower profit margins, higher cost
efficiency and lower profit efficiency. In absolute levels, we also expect cost
reductions. The dynamics of the consolidation process, however, may have
increased the volatility of earnings. 
Although we have emphasized the many different ways of looking at
competition and profitability, most empirical performance measured
reviewed here tell a fairly similar story, with two important exceptions. First,
the cost-income ratio is not correlated with other measures: competitive
conditions affect revenues more strongly. In addition, relative performance as
measured by cost X-efficiency does correlate with most other performance
measures, and has shown a marked decrease over time. Savings and
co-operative banks are relatively efficient. These plain banks tend to perform
the traditional intermediary role that is assumed in most of the models
reviewed here. With increasing disintermediation, the question arises as to
how to interpret this result. Second, the Panzar-Rosse model indicates that
competition has increased over the last decade. Other evidence, however,
points in the opposite direction: returns (ROA and ROE) have increased, and
concentration has gone up. At the same time, interest rate margins have fallen
somewhat. The Panzar-Rosse model may have picked up the effects of
internationalization that have not been picked up by other measures. 
Country comparisons reveal marked differences between countries.
Therefore, controlling for country-specific circumstances remains crucial in
comparative studies, such as the metafrontier technique, applied to European
countries. Although markets may have become more contestable and foreign
competition may have intensified, performance – both absolutely and
relatively – is not easily exported across borders, due to these differences in
national competitive conditions. Relative performance, as measured by
X-efficiency, can shed some light on these differences. The comparison of
72 Conclusionscost and profit X-efficiency reveals that there is no clear correlation between
the two measures. Hence, estimating both types of efficiency may be useful
as an indirect measure of market power. 
At this point, we may draw up a future research agenda. Our first
recommendation concerns the use of data. Although we are aware of the
difficulty of finding good (proxies for) output prices, this paper has once
again emphasized the need for output prices in an analysis of bank
competition and profitability. Without output prices, we are unable to
calculate banks’ mark-up on costs or to derive the reaction functions to their
competitors. As a result we know very little about the differences between
banks in a single market. The increase in concentration in all markets
reviewed here makes this an important concern. A change in the definition of
the production process of banks would also be welcome. We need to rethink
the traditional intermediation approach and focus more on other types of
income. Our choice of variables in all models described here is mostly
determined by banks’ balance sheets. An increasing part of the action in
today’s banking markets, however, takes place off the balance sheet.
Including off-balance sheet items in the intermediation approach therefore is
a first step towards a more balanced view of bank production. 
Our second recommendation regards the theoretical foundation of the models
employed to measure market power and efficiency. As we have shown,
models focussing on a single variable may suffer from identification
problems. In particular, we emphasize the distinction between market power
and efficiency, for example using the efficiency hypothesis test in section
3.3.3 or through a comparison of cost and profit efficiency. In addition, the
fact that we observe such strong trends in banking calls for time-dependent
models. In particular, we stress the need for making both the price-elasticity
of demand η D and conjectural variation λ time-dependent. 
Our third recommendation concerns the market under examination. For
reduced-form market structure models such as the SCP model, we advocate
their application to a wider range of specific submarkets. (Sub)markets that
are not very contestable and have experienced less internationalization (e.g.
deposits or mortgages) lend themselves particularly well to this type of
analysis. For non-structural models such as Iwata, Panzar-Rosse and
Bresnahan we suggest estimating a different H or λ for different size classes
and submarkets. 
Conclusions 73As a final remark, we observe that all models introduced here are highly
complementary. For example, whereas some lend themselves better to assess
the impact of disintermediation, others are more suitable for analyzing the
consequences of internationalization. By using several complementary
models we can overcome the identification problems that arise when we limit
ourselves to applying a single model to analyze bank competition and
profitability.
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78 ReferencesAppendix: The Stigler Approach
In this appendix we show that, presuming the de facto existence of collusive
behavior, the extent to which banks will engage in collusive behavior is directly
and positively related to their market share.
60An increase in market share (MSi)
leads to an increase in awareness (λ i), and thereby to collusive behavior.
61
To prove this, we depart from Stigler’s rule that the (pricing) behavior of firms
must be inferred from the way their customers react. The assumption then is
that “[T]here is no competitive price-cutting if there are no shifts of buyers
among sellers” (Stigler (1964), p. 48). Thus, the higher the loyalty of
customers, the less likely abank is to behave collusively. Intuitively, the higher
customer loyalty, the less a bank has to gain by cutting prices: it does not have
to do so to keep its old customers nor does it expect to gain a lot of new
customers. In terms of the dynamic Cournot model, the lower the conjectural
variation λ i, the more likely the bank is to engage in collusive behavior. 
In line with Stigler (1964), a bank targets three groups of customers. First, it
wants its share of the growth of new customers [Cn]. Second, it wants to retain
as many of its old customers as possible [Cr]. Third, it wants growth through
other banks’ old customers [Co]. Let Nn = number of new customers, and
No = the total number of old buyers in the market.
62 Also, let no
i = the number
of old customers for bank i. The probability of repeat purchases is denoted p,
and MSi is bank i’s market share.
63 The expected number of customers for





60 This appendix is taken from Bos (2004).
61 On a market level, the notion that concentration “facilitates collusion between firms and
increases industry-wide profits” (Tirole (1993), p. 222) is widely accepted.
62 Where .
63 Where .For each group the cost of cheating (i.e. not behaving collusively) is given by
the variance of the expected number of customers. The higher this variance,
the more likely a bank is to show collusive behavior. For each set of





As explained, an increase in market share (MSi) leads to more collusive




Equations 31 and 33 hold if MSi < 0.5. Equation 29 holds if p > 2p
2 * MSi. If







o are disjoint subsets of the whole customer population (i.e.
there is no overlap), we can simply add up their variances, which under the
above mentioned conditions are larger than zero. Summing up therefore, an
increase in market share MSi leads to an increase in awareness λ i and hence to
more collusive behavior.  
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64 A bank expects a consumer to become either customer (with expectations dependent on its
current market share) or not. Thus, for the binomial mean µ= n * p, variance is n * π (1–π ).83
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